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Abstract 
The JUD-IT Handbook provides a tool for judicial authorities, law enforcement actors, and defence 
lawyers to better navigate the complex legal and institutional framework governing cross-border 
cooperation for accessing and exchanging electronic information sought in the context of criminal 
proceedings. Based on the JUD-IT Project findings, the Handbook identifies ways in which existing 
instruments of criminal justice cooperation in the field of evidence gathering can be used in practice to 
request and obtain data held by service providers across borders. It does so through an overview of the 
main legal channels and actors to be involved in the issuing, validation, and execution of cross-border 
data requests within the EU and in transatlantic relations. The Handbook offers guidance that is of value 
for those concerned with ensuring that data are accessed, collected and exchanged across borders in 
full compliance with the fundamental right of individuals – including both suspects and accused persons 
as well data subjects – and admitted as evidence in criminal proceedings. 
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1. Introduction 
The exponential use of internet services for daily communications and activities has led 
investigating and prosecuting authorities (including both police and judicial actors)1 to rely 
increasingly on the access to and collection of electronic information for the investigation and 
prosecution of crime. Different types of data2 are currently sought after not only for the 
countering of ‘cybercrime’ (both target and content-related), but also for the investigation and 
prosecution of criminal offences in the ‘offline world’. 
If data stored by private service providers in different countries, or in the cloud, increasingly 
constitute valuable evidentiary sources, investigative measures targeting electronic 
information also raise several legal, procedural, and practical dilemmas that impose careful 
consideration.  
The conditions and circumstances justifying law enforcement requests for data largely depend 
on national laws, which also identify the authorities competent for respectively issuing, 
validating, and executing such measures. National provisions regulating access to data for the 
purpose of investigating and prosecuting crime are linked to the notion of jurisdiction and its 
assertion over both individuals and companies holding the data sought. The concept of 
jurisdiction is connected to states’ territory, but also with states’ responsibility to investigate 
and prosecute crime while at the same time protecting the rights of citizens and individuals 
under their jurisdiction. 
When it comes to access to data sought in criminal proceedings, the notion of jurisdiction 
therefore presents two distinct but closely intertwined ramifications: 
• The first relates to criminal law and its enforcement in the context of criminal 
investigations and the prosecution of crime; 
• The second pertains to fundamental rights law, which in the EU legal system guarantees 
both the right to privacy and data protection, and the rights of the defence/fair trial. 
The transnational and cross-border nature of the internet is often a source of jurisdictional 
based practitioners seeking access to data in the context of criminal proceedings. A request for 
data that is lawful under the law of the issuing state, might not be considered so in the country 
where such measure has to be executed. Unilateral assertions of criminal jurisdiction in the 
field of data gathering can seriously harm trust in intra-EU and international relations, and 
expose individuals to risks of fundamental rights abuses.  
At the international and EU levels, a number of instruments are available to investigating and 
prosecuting authorities, as well as to defence lawyers, seeking to cooperate among them in 
order to access and exchange obtain data across borders. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties 
(MLATs) provide the possibility for judicial authorities to channel their requests for data 
through formal and centralised venues of international judicial cooperation. Regulating access 
 
1 See the glossary in this Handbook. 
2 Ibid. 
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to data in the fight against crime now also falls squarely under the sphere of EU competence, 
and specific norms developed at the Union’s level currently apply depending on the specific 
purpose for which electronic information are sought. As far as collection of electronic 
information to be used as evidence in criminal proceedings is concerned, the European 
Investigation Order (EIO) allows participating member states to issue and execute cross-border 
evidence gathering measures based on the principle of mutual recognition of judicial decision.3 
Both MLATs and the EIO rely on a model of judicial cooperation in cross-border evidence 
gathering which relies on the involvement of judicial authorities (including, depending on the 
specific case and stage of the proceeding, judges or prosecutors) in both the country of issuing 
and the country of execution of a request for data sought for criminal justice purposes. This 
‘mediated model’ of judicial cooperation4 is designed to allow investigating and prosecuting 
authorities to request, collect, and exchange electronic data, while at the same time preventing 
conflicts of laws and jurisdiction through the exercise of reciprocal oversight over cross-border 
enforcement of criminal justice decisions directed at gathering evidence across borders. 
1.1 Why is the JUD-IT Handbook needed? 
The JUD-IT Project research demonstrated that law enforcement actors, judicial authorities, 
and defence lawyers still struggle in mutually understanding the substantial and procedural 
conditions to be met in the EU and third countries in order to lawfully request, access and 
exchange electronic information held by private companies across borders or in the cloud. A 
major obstacle faced by practitioners is that they are often “lost in translation” due to the 
different constitutional traditions, legal terms and notions used across various countries.  
And yet, compliance with the multi-layered set of national, international, and EU norms and 
standards regulating access to data in the context of criminal investigation is crucial to ensure 
that electronic data gathered across borders can be presented and admitted as electronic 
evidence before a court. Respect of EU criminal justice and fundamental rights standards is in 
particular required to all member states’ investigating and prosecuting authorities, which, 
acting under the scope of EU law, seek to access data across borders (both within and outside 
the EU). These standards must also be respected by foreign authorities requesting electronic 
information (pertaining to EU citizens or not), or held by private companies operating under EU 
law. Furthermore, they are binding upon the service providers holding the data sought.5 
The JUD-IT Handbook provides streamlined guidelines, explanations, comments and links to the 
legal provisions currently regulating access to data for criminal justice-related purposes. By 
 
3 See infra, Section 1.1. 
4 Carrera, C., González Fuster, G., Guild, E., Mitsilegas, V., (2015), ‘Access to Electronic Data by Third-Country Law 
Enforcement Authorities: Challenges to EU Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights’, CEPS Research Paper, 
https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/access-electronic-data-third-country-law-enforcement-authorities-
challenges-eu-rule-law/.  
5 Stefan, M., González Fuster, G. (2019),’Cross-border Access to Electronic Data through Judicial Cooperation in 
Criminal Matters: State of the art and latest developments in the EU and the US’, JUD-IT State of the Art Report 
No. 1, https://www.ceps.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/MSGGF_JudicialCooperationInCriminalMatters-2.pdf.  
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doing so, it addresses some knowledge gaps that hamper the full potentials and correct 
functioning of the instruments of judicial cooperation currently available within the EU and at 
the transatlantic level for the collection of data to be used in the context of criminal 
proceedings. 
1.2 Who does the JUD-IT Handbook target? 
The JUD-IT Handbook will be of help for judicial actors, legal practitioners, and law enforcement 
officials across the EU to navigate the existing legal and institutional framework in an easier 
way. 
The Handbook outlines the main legal and administrative processes to be followed for the 
issuing and execution of investigative or prosecutorial measures directed at accessing, 
collecting, and exchanging data held by private companies across borders and sought in the 
context of criminal proceedings. 
The categories of stakeholders that will benefit from the JUD-IT Handbook include EU member 
states’ judges, prosecutors, and defence lawyers participating - in their respective capacity - in 
the issuing, validating and execution phases of cross-border requests for electronic information 
to be used as evidence in criminal matters.  
1.3 Structure of the Handbook 
The Handbook is comprised of two main sections. The first section provides textual and visual 
guidelines to the different EU law instruments available to EU member state investigating and 
prosecuting authorities, as well as to criminal defence lawyers for seeking and obtaining data 
across borders in the context of criminal proceedings. A number of text boxes are included 
throughout the first section of the Handbook to provide synthetic explanations of key legal 
concepts. The understanding of such legal concept is of central importance for the correct 
everyday use of existing instruments of judicial cooperation for cross-border evidence 
gathering in criminal matters.  
The second section consists of checklists to help legal practitioners, including both investigating 
and prosecuting authorities,6 and defence lawyers,7 in the use of the existing EU judicial 
cooperation instruments – and most notably the EIO – to deal with the different legal, 
procedural and administrative challenges related to the issuing, validating, or execution of 




6 See Section 2.1 below. 
7 See Section 2.2 below. 
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The JUD-IT Handbook is complemented by three Annexes: 
• A glossary with definitions of key actors and concepts pertaining to cross-border criminal 
investigations, and access to electronic information in such context (Annex I); 
• A summary of selected case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
setting forth some of the fundamental rights standards to be taken into account in order 
for cross-border requests for electronic information sought in the context of criminal 
proceedings to be considered lawful under EU law (Annex II); 
• An inventory providing a synthetic overview of relevant the national legal frameworks that 
EU countries covered by the JUD-IT Research have in place to regulate investigating and 
prosecuting authorities’ requests for electronic information (Annex III);8   
• A methodology section explaining the process followed to develop the Handbook (Annex IV). 
  
 
8 The results of the country-level research generated by the institutions involved in the JUD-IT national-level 
research is available – in the form of dedicated country briefs – on the JUD-IT Project website. 
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2. The legal framework: how does it work? 
There are several different judicial cooperation instruments currently available for investigating 
and prosecuting authorities across the EU to request and obtain data sought in criminal 
proceedings.  
The European Investigation Order,9 the 2000 Mutual Legal Assistance Convention,10 the 2013 
EU-US Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA),11 and other bilateral MLATs in place with 
third countries such as the US are the most important judicial cooperation tools for mediated 
cross-border access to data held by private companies. All these instruments are based on the 
notion of judicial cooperation between competent authorities of the country of issuing and 
execution of a cross-border data request. Judicial cooperation and mediated access to data is 
at the heart of these EU and international cooperation instruments. 
Besides the instruments mentioned above, the 2001 Council of Europe (CoE) Convention on 
Cybercrime (the so-called Budapest Convention) also provides a forum for cross-border 
cooperation in data gathering for law enforcement and criminal justice purposes. While largely 
espousing the mediated model of cooperation for cross-border data access, the Budapest 
Convention also foresees the possibility – under certain conditions and circumstances – for law 
enforcement authorities to address their requests for data (in the form of preservation and 
production orders) directly to service providers.12  
In addition to the instruments mentioned above, other cross-border data-gathering tools 
(existing, or under discussion at the EU and international level) are designed in ways which 
provide (or would provide) the possibility for public authorities to request the data directly from 
private companies. These instruments propose an alternative model of cross-border data 
gathering which can be described of ‘unmediated access’. Instruments for unmediated access 
do not rely on the involvement of an authority mediating the submitted request in the country 
where the data-gathering measure is addressed and has to be executed. 
This Handbook pays specific attention to the functioning of existing EU law-based instruments 
of judicial cooperation for mediated access to data and evidence gathering in criminal matters. 
These instruments currently encompass the European Investigation Order and the MLATs with 
the US. Given the practical relevance of cooperation with Ireland (which is not party to the EIO, 
nor signatory of the Budapest Convention) in the field of cross-border data gathering, attention 
is also paid to the functioning of MLA cooperation with this EU country. 
 
9 Directive 2014/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 regarding the European 
Investigation Order in criminal matters, OJ L 130, 1.5.2014.   
10 Council Act of 29 May 2000 establishing in accordance with Article 34 of the Treaty on European Union the 
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European Union, OJ C 
197, 12.7.2000, p. 1 and its Protocol.   
11 Agreement of 25 June 2003 on mutual legal assistance between the European Union and the United States of 
America.  
12 See article 16, 17, 18 of the Budapest Convention. 
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Figure 1 below provides an overview of the different legal instruments currently in place to 
issue and execute cross-border measures entailing access to and collection of data held by 
private companies across borders, and the measures they cover. It also schematises their 
geographical scope of application, as well as the main categories of data that can be requested 
and accessed through them.  
The existing EU instruments of judicial of judicial cooperation for cross-border gathering of 
evidence incorporate and must be interpreted and used in line with standing rule of law and 
fundamental right standards enshrined in EU primary and secondary law. Is important to recall 
that a number of EU primary law safeguards apply across all areas of EU law, including those 
referred to in Title V of Part Three of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) and relating to the AFSJ. The consistent application of such standards to all activities 
entailing access to and exchange of data in the fight against crime is required to prevent that 
these initiatives translate into arbitrary or unjustified interferences with individuals’ rights. 
Of special relevance in this context are the guarantees that the European Union Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (EU Charter) sets forth with regard to the right to respect for private life 
(Article 7) and data protection (Article 8). A synthetic overview of how such standards have 
been interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in a selection of 
landmark cases is included in Annex 2.  
 
JUD-IT HANDBOOK | 7 
 
Figure 1. Criminal proceedings and cross-border data gathering: the available instruments 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.
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2.1 Intra-EU cooperation: The European Investigation Order 
2.1.1 Geographic and material scope 
Within the EU, the EIO allows cross-border requests for data sought in different phases of a 
criminal proceeding to be issued and executed based on the principle of mutual recognition of 
judicial decisions. 
Box 1. The principle of mutual recognition in criminal matters  
The principle of mutual recognition 
EU judicial cooperation in criminal matters is currently governed by the principle of mutual 
recognition. The principle of mutual recognition implies a high degree of automaticity in the 
execution of judicial decisions issued by competent member state judicial authorities, and in the 
frame of judicial procedures in which political authorities do not participate. 
Cooperation among the judicial authorities of the issuing and executing member states should 
take place within a limited timeframe, under strict deadlines, and on the basis of a pro forma 
document that is usually annexed to the relevant framework decisions or directives. The principle 
of mutual recognition requires the authorities of the executing country to recognise decisions 
from other member state with a minimum of procedure and formality, and the grounds for non-
recognition must be kept to the minimum required.  
EU mutual recognition instruments (e.g. the EAW and the European Investigation Order) build 
on some underpinning principles – mutual trust at the forefront – that apply only to EU member 
states. Member states are required to trust that each other’s criminal justice decisions – including 
cross-border measures directed at obtaining electronic information for the purpose of 
preventing, detecting, or combating crime – adhere to the values enshrined in Article 2 of the 
TEU, the EU Charter, and the safeguards found in secondary pieces of EU legislation. By 
demanding that each EU country consider all the others to be compliant with fundamental rights, 
mutual trust prevents, in principle, member states from taking unilateral action that runs counter 
to mutual recognition or that may compromise the primacy, unity, and effectiveness of EU law. 
At the same time, the free movement of judgments should not be implemented to the detriment 
of respect for the rule of law and fundamental rights. Mutual recognition shall not have the effect 
of modifying the EU member states’ obligation to ensure respect of the fundamental rights and 
core legal protections provided under EU law. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
has repeatedly stressed that whereas the execution of a member state order is deemed to 
constitute a manifest breach of a rule of law regarded as essential in the legal order of the other 
state in which enforcement is sought, or of a right recognised as being fundamental within that 
legal order, the refusal to recognise or enforce an order given in another member state is 
justified. 
The duty to verify compliance with fundamental rights and the rule of law standards relies, in the 
first place, upon the authorities responsible for issuing or validating a decision to enforce criminal 
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jurisdiction across borders. Most notably, EU law entrusts the authorities of the issuing member 
state with the responsibility of assessing the legality, necessity and proportionality of a cross-
border measure entailing access to data sought for criminal justice-related purposes.  
Existing EU law instruments for mutual recognition of judicial decisions in criminal matters also 
foresee the involvement of competent authorities in the EU country where a criminal justice 
measure is to be executed. In particular, recent CJEU case law shows that the role of judicial 
oversight in the executing state is central to verifying the existence of those exceptional 
circumstances in the presence of which the principle of mutual recognition ceases to operate. 
Judicial scrutiny by the executing member state authorities remains especially crucial in a context 
where member state criminal justice systems perform differently under important judicial 
independence indicators. The lack of judicial independence and ‘prosecutorial bias’ in issuing 
countries entail the risks of quasi-automatic approval of all data requests from the prosecutors 
and constitute a danger not only for the fundamental rights of the persons concerned, but also 
for the independence of the judiciary and EU rule of law as a whole. 
 
Among participating member states (EU27, minus Ireland and Denmark),13 the EIO replaces 
previous instruments for criminal justice cooperation regulating the exchange of evidence 
through mutual legal assistance. When judicial authorities in an EU member state participating 
in the EIO aim at having an investigative measure entailing access to and collection of electronic 
information executed in another EU member state participating in the EIO, the judicial 
cooperation channels provided by EIO should be used. 
For data requests issued in the context of intra-EU judicial proceedings, the EIO should be 
preferred to ‘direct cooperation’ with service providers abroad, given that, to date, this latter 
way of working remains voluntary. As far as cross-border measures targeting data held by 
service providers in another EU country, it should in fact be recalled that under the national 
legislation of all EU member states, providers of IT and telecommunication services are not 
allowed to respond to direct requests for data issued by foreign investigating and prosecuting 
authorities. 
2.1.2 For which measures can EIOs be issued and executed? 
Through the EIO, a wide range of cross-border investigative measures can be issued and 
executed, ranging from hearing of witnesses to interception of communication. One single EIO 
can foresee the execution of more than just one investigative measure.  
While EIO legislation does not expressly mention “electronic evidence” as such, the inclusion 
of a reference to data in Article 13 of the Directive indicates that different categories of 
electronic information can be collected and exchanged across borders through this judicial 
cooperation instrument. EIOs can also cover the “collection of traffic and location data 
 
13 Under the Lisbon Treaty, Ireland and Denmark can opt into (or opt out from) any post-Lisbon legislative proposal 
in the field of criminal justice on a case-by-case basis. 
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associated with telecommunications, allowing competent authorities to issue an EIO for the 
purpose of obtaining less intrusive data on telecommunications”.14   
Investigative measures requiring data allowing for the identification of persons holding a 
subscription to a specified phone number or IP are always available under the EIO, and cannot 
be refused in the country where the order is addressed based on the objection that such 
measures are not available in that legal system. 
EIOs can be issued and executed for the investigation and/or prosecution of several criminal or 
administrative offences. Under the EIO a limited double criminality check is maintained, but 
only for orders related to offences falling outside the list of the 32 offences for which double 
criminality has been abolished. These are offences which are not punishable by a custodial 
sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least three years in the issuing 
member state.15 Such provisions ensure that double criminality grounds might only be raised 
by the competent authorities of the state of execution for certain categories of less serious 
offences. 
The executing country might decide not to recognise EIOs relating to a criminal offence 
allegedly committed outside the territory of the issuing state and wholly or partially on the 
territory of the executing state, and the conduct in connection with which the EIO is issued is 
not an offence in the executing state.16 EIOs might also not be recognised when the use of the 
investigative measure indicated in the EIO is restricted under the law of the executing state to 
a list or category of offences or to offences punishable by a certain threshold, which does not 
include the offence covered by the EIO.17 
In some EU countries, access to and gathering of electronic information is only allowed in the 
context of criminal investigation or prosecution of ‘serious crime’. This concept, however, 
assumes different meanings in specific national legal systems, and currently it still lacks a 
definition under EU law.18  
2.1.3 Who can issue and execute EIOs entailing access to and collection of electronic 
information? 
As an EU instrument of mutual recognition of judicial decisions in criminal matters, the EIO 
requires the systematic involvement of competent judicial authorities in the issuing and 
executing member states. 
Member state national laws identify the judicial authorities responsible for respectively 
requesting, validating, and executing investigative measures targeting electronic information. 
 
14 Recital 11 of the EIO Directive . 
15 Art. 11(1)(g) of the EIO Directive. 
16 Art. 11(1)(e) of the EIO Directive.  
17 Art. 11(1)(h) of the EIO Directive. 
18 Carrera, S. and Stefan, M. (2020), ‘Access to Electronic Data for Criminal Investigations Purposes in the EU, JUD-It 
Project Report’, pp. 14-18, https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/access-to-electronic-data-for-criminal-
investigations-purposes-in-the-eu/.  
JUD-IT HANDBOOK | 11 
 
To assist in clarifying the interpretation of the scope of the EIO DIR, the European Judicial 
Network (EJN) Secretariat has published a document, Competent authorities, languages 
accepted, urgent matters and scope of the EIO Directive, which is available to practitioners on 
the EJN website. It includes a complete and regularly updated list of competent judicial 
authorities for the purpose of the issuing and execution of EIOs.  
In each member state, the judicial authority responsible for issuing, validating, or executing an 
EIO concerning access to or gathering of electronic data, might vary depending on factors such 
as the:  
• Type of offence for which a EIO is issued and has to be executed (in several countries, 
the authorities responsible for requesting and validating investigative measures 
directed at accessing or gathering data vary depending on the seriousness of the crime 
investigated/prosecuted); 
• Type of data sought (e.g. content data; metadata including traffic and location data; 
subscriber information; IP addresses, etc.);  
• Investigative measure envisaged (e.g. preservation of data; production of data; search 
and seizures of computer devices; measure intended as coercive or non-coercive in the 
legal system of EIO issuing or execution, etc.); 
• Categories of persons affected (e.g. lawyers, journalists); 
• Stage of the proceeding in which the EIO is to be issued and executed (pre-trial phase; 
trial phase). 
The involvement of the right oversight authorities in the issuing state is necessary to ensure 
that EIOs are not used for the performance of investigative measures/gathering of evidence 
that are not available at the domestic level for an equivalent case. EIOs may in fact only be 
issued if the substantial and procedural conditions applying to the domestic investigation or 
trial are met. 
The involvement of the right oversight authorities in the execution state allows for the 
‘domestication’ of an EIO coming from another member state with a different constitutional 
tradition, and ensures that every order is executed in accordance with the procedures (and 
underlying constitutional safeguards) prescribed under the national system of execution. 
While prosecutors might be entitled for issuing and/or executing EIOs, it is important to 
remember that prior independent judicial validation by a judge or court is often required for 
requests for different categories of data, including data such as subscriber’s information, IP 
addresses, etc.  
EIOs can also be issued at the request of defence lawyers at each stage of the proceeding. Art. 
1(3) of the EIO directive provides that the issuing of the EIO may be requested by the suspect 
or accused person (or by a lawyer on his behalf) within the framework of applicable defence 
rights in conformity with national criminal procedure. 
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2.1.4 Issuing and execution of data requests under the EIO 
The EIO system requires member states to cooperate in the field of cross-border evidence 
gathering based on minimum formality and speed, while at the same time imposing compliance 
with a set of legal and procedural safeguards.  
In the issuing state, the competent judicial authorities for the adoption or validation of the 
investigative measures included in the EIO member state are required to verify the legality, 
necessity and proportionality of a cross-border decision entailing access to or gathering of 
electronic information.19 Legality, necessity and proportionality must be assessed by a 
competent judicial authority in light of legal standards provided under EU criminal justice and 
data protection law, as well as by the law of the issuing state. 
The executing authority needs to follow the formalities and procedures expressly indicated by 
the issuing authority, but only to the extent that these are not contrary to fundamental 
safeguards provided under their own legal system. Execution of an EIO is supposed to take 
place in the same ways and under the same modalities (and related procedural safeguards) as 
if the investigative measure concerned had been ordered by an authority of the executing state. 
The competent authorities of the member state receiving an EIO have a maximum period of 30 
days to decide to recognise the request, and 90 days to execute the request effectively. The 
Directive also allows for a shorter deadline when required by the seriousness of the offence or 
in other particularly urgent circumstances, and this should be taken into consideration to the 
greatest extent possible by the competent authorities of the EU country of execution when 
processing the order. Article 32(2) of the Directive provides for a 24-hour deadline for 
provisional measures, such as the preservation of data. 
Figure 2 below describes the main steps to be undertaken throughout the issuing and execution 
of an EIO entailing access to or gathering of electronic information.  
 
19 Art. 6(1)(a) of the EIO Directive. 
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Figure 2. Issuing and executing EIOs: main steps and control points 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
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Article 11 of the EIO Directive contemplates a set of limited non-recognition grounds. 
Recognition or execution of an EIO may be refused in the executing state where, inter alia, the 
execution of the investigative measure indicated in the EIO would: 
• Breach immunities, privileges, or rules on determination and limitation of criminal 
liability relating to freedom of the press and freedom of expression in other media; 
• Harm essential national security interests, jeopardise sources of the information or 
involve the use of classified information relating to specific intelligence activities; 
• Be contrary to the principle of ne bis in idem; 
• Be incompatible with EU fundamental rights (Article 6 TEU and the EU Charter); 
Persons accused or suspected of crimes, third parties affected by the EIO, and addressees of 
the orders (including private companies) have the right to seek remedies in the issuing member 
state.  The issuing state must ensure that legal remedies equivalent to those available in a 
similar domestic case are applicable to the investigative measures indicated in the EIO. 
Remedies in the issuing state are without prejudice to the guarantees of fundamental rights in 
the executing state. 
2.1.5 At which stage of the proceeding can EIOs be issued/executed? 
The EIO applies to the gathering of evidence during both the pre-trial phase of a proceedings 
(e.g. the investigative phase), as well as also during the trial phase. 
In some member states, the EIO can also apply to measures related to the execution of a 
judgement (e.g. during a financial investigation for the purpose of identifying assets after a final 
decision on confiscation has been adopted, or to gather evidence on the circumstances 
surrounding the execution of a sentence).  
2.2 Mutual Legal Assistance  
As far as cross-border demands for electronic information involving EU member states not part 
to the EIO Directive (i.e. Ireland or Denmark), or third countries (e.g. the US or Japan), EU 
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) provide channels that can be used for requesting, 
gathering and exchanging data for criminal justice purposes. 
With several major IT service providers established in their territories, Ireland and the US are 
the recipients of high volumes of data requests from EU countries’ investigating and 
prosecuting authorities. The proper functioning of MLA cooperation depends, to a significant 
extent, on a good understanding of both: 
• The roles played by the different actors involved in the MLA process, and; 
• The main legal requirements that MLA requests issued by EU member states need to meet 
in order to be accepted by the competent authorities of these two receiving countries. 
Addressing MLA requests through the right authorities and following standing rules can 
significantly enhance cooperation between EU investigating and prosecuting authorities issuing 
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MLA requests on the one hand, and the authorities responsible for receiving, assessing and 
executing the investigative measures indicated in the MLA requests. 
2.2.1 MLAs requests to Ireland 
When it comes to MLA cooperation with Ireland, it should be noted that considerations of 
whether to execute a cross-border request for electronic data sent to this EU member state 
are mainly undertaken by the Ministry of Justice and Equality.20 
Ireland’s Ministry of Justice and Equality is the main authority responsible for assessing the 
suitability for execution of incoming MLA request concerning evidence (also in digital form) 
sought for the purposes of criminal proceedings or a criminal investigation in the requesting 
state. The Ministry of Justice and Equality’s assessment of the request is conducted based on 
the following requirements: 
• The request concerns assistance in obtaining specified evidential material; 
• There is power to issue a warrant for the search of a place in respect of an offence 
constituted by the conduct giving rise to the request; 
• The evidence is sought for an offence punishable both in Ireland and the requesting EU 
state by imprisonment for a maximum period of at least 6 months; or the offence is a 
criminal offence in Ireland and an administrative offence in the requesting member state 
that could give rise to proceedings before a court having, in particular, jurisdiction in 
criminal matters; 
• The requested evidence will not be used for any purpose other than for which it was 
requested; 
The MLA request will be refused if, inter alia, the Minister considers that providing assistance 
would be likely to prejudice the sovereignty, security or other essential interests of Ireland or 
be contrary to ordre public, or if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the request is of 
a discriminatory nature, providing assistance would lead to violation of a person’s rights under 
the ECHR (including prohibition of torture), or (and for as long as) providing assistance would 
prejudice a criminal investigation or criminal proceedings in Ireland.  
If Ireland’s Ministry of Justice and Equality considers that a request for mutual legal 
assistance/cross-border request for access to electronic data meets the above mentioned 
conditions, it shall direct the Ireland’s Commissioner of the Garda Síochána to obtain such 
evidence for transmission.  
Figure 3 below provides a visual guide to the main steps involved in the execution of MLA 
requests directed to and coming from Ireland.  
 
20 The Department (of Justice and Equality) determines internally which procedure to use in order to respond to 
an MLA request, with section 75 of the Criminal Justice (Mutual Assistance) Act 2008 Act being the ‘standard 
procedure’. 
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Figure 3. MLA cooperation with Ireland 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
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Representatives of the Ministry of Justice and Equality heard during the JUD-IT Project noted 
that, according to their experience, service providers “generally cooperate with requests made 
under MLA procedures”. Replies obtained through the JUD-IT questionnaire indicate that 
channelling requests for data through MLA processes, domestication via local court orders 
and/or access via Irish law enforcement authorities are the conditions under which 
investigating or prosecuting authorities from other jurisdictions can lawfully request and obtain 
access to electronic information from service providers under Irish law.  
Box 2. MLA vs direct access: the ‘Microsoft Ireland’ case 
The ‘Microsoft Ireland’ case 
The jurisdictional, legal and practical challenges that come from direct (i.e. non-judicially 
mediated) requests for access to electronic information held by service providers in Ireland were 
made manifest in the long-running dispute underlying the case of Microsoft Ireland v Department 
of Justice.21 
The case originated in Microsoft’s refusal to execute a warrant received directly by US 
authorities, which requested Microsoft Ireland to disclose some data stored in the EU. This type 
of extraterritorial exercise of criminal jurisdiction is a longstanding practice of US LEAs, and the 
US Department of Justice argued that its warrant authority under the Stored Communication Act 
compelled US-based companies to turn over the requested data, regardless of where the latter 
were stored. Microsoft, by contrast, maintained that this authority did not extend to data located 
outside United States territory.22 The company consequently challenged the US warrant’s power 
to reach overseas data.23 
The case, which had been pending appeal before the US Supreme Court, was ultimately 
dismissed. Meanwhile, policy and legislative efforts have been directed at the creation of new 
data-gathering tools for crime fighting across the Atlantic, but also within the EU. In the US, the 
signature of the Clarifying Lawful Use of Overseas Data (CLOUD) Act constituted a significant step 
in that direction. 
After the authority of US federal courts to issue warrants for the search and seizure of data 
located outside the territory of the United States was challenged in the ‘Microsoft Ireland’ case, 
the US government introduced the CLOUD Act,24 which the US legislator adopted with the 
intention to clarify that the SCA’s scope of application extends to data stored abroad. 
 
21 Warrant to Search a Certain Email Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp. 3. 15 F. Supp. 3d 466 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
22 Stored Communications Act (SCA), codified at 18 U.S.C. Chapter 121 §§ 2701–2712. Under the SCA, US law 
enforcement actors are authorised to compel US providers to disclose information about a person, regardless of 
both the nationality of the data subject and the localisation of the data. 
23 A detailed account of the arguments defended by the parties and of the main legal and jurisdictional issues 
underlying the dispute if provided in Carrera, S. and others (2015), op. cit.  
24 Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD Act), S. 2383, H.R. 4943. 
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Part I of Act 32 now formally grants US authorities the power, under US law, to order private 
companies to disclose the “content of a wire or electronic communication and any record of 
other information” about a person, regardless of either the nationality of the latter or the 
location of the data. Providers can also be ordered to preserve data in their possession for up to 
180 days prior to the issuance of any compulsory process. 
From an EU law perspective, a number of questions arise with regard to the CLOUD Act’s fitness 
to provide a sound legal basis for the gathering and transfer of data in the context of cross-border 
criminal proceedings.25 
 
The execution of EU member state authorities’ requests for data addressed directly to service 
providers in Ireland are, instead, dependent on the assessment conducted on a case-by-case 
basis by the private company recipient of the request. JUD-IT research has showed that US 
cloud service providers with branches in Ireland usually respond to requests for data in the 
following ways: 
• Requests for content data held by the company are automatically redirected by the 
company to its USA branch;  
• Requests for non-content data might be executed upon Company’s own assessment. In the 
performance of such assessment, some company follows a “3-pronged approach”: 
 User is under the jurisdiction of issuing authority; 
 The request is based on the issuing authorities’ own legal process; 
 Respect of international human rights standards.  
Formal MLA instruments constitute therefore the only formal and therefore reliable tools of 
judicial cooperation available when it comes to the transmission, reception, validation and 
execution of requests for data originating from foreign (i.e. non-Irish) investigating and 
prosecuting authorities. 
2.2.2 MLA requests to the US 
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) are the traditional channel of cooperation for cross-
border gathering and exchange of electronic information between the EU and the US. The EU-
US MLA Agreement complements existing bilateral treaties and amends some of their 
provisions, if they provide for “less effective avenues” of cooperation between EU member 
states and the US.26 
Exchange of evidence under MLATs with the US relies on the involvement of different 
authorities, including the political bodies and judicial actors responsible for supervising and 
examining cross-border requests for evidence gathering against domestic standards.  
 
25 Carrera and Stefan (2020), op. cit., and Stefan and González Fuster (2019), op. cit.  
26 See Article 3(2)(a) of the EU–US MLA Agreement. 
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MLA requests originating from a EU member state and directed to the US are first reviewed by 
the central authority of the requesting state. Once ready, the MLA request is sent to the US 
Office of International Affairs of the Department of Justice (OIA). The OIA analyses the request 
against US constitutional requirements and sends it to the US Attorney’s Office established 
where the company holding the data is located. The US Attorney’s Office defends the request 
in front of a judge (and in presence of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation – FBI). If the US 
judge grants the warrant, the request is then sent to the private company.  
When the company produces the data, the FBI first conducts a screening to verify that the they 
do not exceed the request, and then sends it on a CD-ROM to the OIA, which finally forwards it 
to the central authority (Ministry of Justice) of the requesting state, from where the data arrives 
to the judge/LEA who initiated the request. Some member states appointed liaison magistrates 
that are based in Washington and are responsible to review the MLATs issued by their country’s 
authority before they are submitted to the central authority of the executing country.  
Figure 4 below provides a visual guide to the main steps involved in the execution of MLA 
requests directed to and coming from the US.  
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Figure 4. MLA cooperation with the US 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.
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The content of electronic communications held by companies in the US might only be obtained 
by EU investigating authorities when a US federal judge has been satisfied of the existence of 
‘probable cause’. The US Stored Communications Act (SCA), which is contained in Title II of the 
Electronic Communication Privacy Act (ECPA), acts in fact as a blocking statute that limits the 
possibility for foreign governments to directly request content data held by IT companies in the 
US, by subjecting their possibility to access electronic information to the requirement of 
independent judicial validation in the US. This means that, even when an order meets the 
probable cause standard, service providers in the US are not currently allowed to respond to 
direct orders (or: ‘requests’) for content data from EU authorities. EU member state judges 
often do not take into due account US legal standards, and most notably the ‘probable cause’ 
one. 
Box 3. US law and the probable cause 
The ‘probable clause’ standard 
EU law enforcement requests for access to data stored in the US are assessed against the 
probable cause standard under the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment limits the 
government’s ability to conduct searches and seizures, and warrants can be issued only after 
independent review by a judge. The Fourth Amendment governs more than simply a person’s 
home or body; its protections apply specifically to communications, covering a person’s “papers 
and effects”. Probable cause that a crime has been committed must be established by the law 
enforcement officer on the basis of “reasonably trustworthy information” that is sufficient to 
cause a reasonably prudent person to believe that an offence has been or is being committed or 
that evidence will be found in the place that is to be searched. Thus, in order to obtain the 
warrant necessary to access data in the US through the MLA procedure, EU authorities must 
prove that an offence has been or is being committed or that evidence will be found in the place 
that is to be searched. 
For certain categories of information, the ECPA would require less than probable cause. For 
instance, the statute specifies that data or electronic communications that have been in storage 
for more than 180 days can be produced upon the issue of a subpoena or a court order, which 
occurs when a judge is persuaded of the existence of ‘specific and articulable facts’ enabling the 
assumption that the requested data are relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation. Still, 
federal appellate courts have progressively extended application of the probable cause 
requirement to these requests. In the United States v Warshak case (2010), the Sixth Circuit 
broadened the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment’s guarantees expanding the probable 
cause standard to include communication that has been in storage for more than 180 days. In 
Riley v California (2014), the Supreme Court stated that “the police generally may not, without a 
warrant, search digital information on a mobile phone seized from an individual who has been 
arrested”. In the Carpenter v United States case (2018), the Supreme Court ruled that in order to 
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obtain mobile phone tracking information (metadata/non-content), law enforcement authorities 
needed a warrant.27 
Companies falling under US jurisdiction can instead provide non-content data to foreign 
authorities on a voluntary basis. JUD-IT research has found no evidence that direct or 
unmediated requests for content data directly addressed to US service providers (i.e. without 
going through MLATs channels) are more successful then MLA requests for the same type of 
data.28  
In relation to ‘emergency requests’, US law allows US service providers to respond to these 
requests following the policies and standards set out by the service providers themselves and 
irrespective of the ‘probable cause’ standards being present. The usual process is that EU 
member state law enforcement authorities liaise with the US authorities who, in turn, facilitate 
the voluntary provision by service providers of the required material pursuant to US law. 
According to the Commission, this arrangement can work very well and, in the most 
exceptionally serious and urgent cases, the US has assisted in the obtaining of evidence in under 
24 hours.29 
At the same time, there is currently no streamlined procedure to follow in the issuing and 
execution of an emergency request. Some US companies developed internal guidelines to deal 
with these type of demands originating from non-US, including EU member state, authorities.  
Box 4. Case Study: Apple’s guidelines on emergency procedure 
Emergency procedure for access to data held by US companies: “the Apple example” 
Apple considers as an emergency request those that relate to circumstances involving 
imminent and serious threats to: 
1) the life/safety of individual(s); 
2) the security of a state; 
3) the security of critical infrastructure/installation(s). 
If the requesting government or law enforcement officer provides satisfactory confirmation 
that their request relates to emergency circumstance(s) involving one or more of the above 
criteria, Apple will examine such a request on an emergency basis. In order to make an 
emergency request to Apple, the requesting government or law enforcement officer should 
complete the Emergency Government & Law Enforcement Information Request form and 
 
27 See Department of Justice, Principles of Federal Prosecution, https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-27000-
principles-federal-prosecution#9-27.200.  
28 González Fuster, G. and Vázquez Maymir, S. (2020), ‘Cross-border Access to E-Evidence: Framing the Evidence’, 
JUD-It Policy Brief. Available at: https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/cross-border-access-to-e-evidence/. 
29 European Commission (2018), “Impact Assessment accompanying the document Proposal for a Regulation of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on European Production and Preservation Orders for electronic 
evidence in criminal matters and Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council laying 
down harmonised rules on the appointment of legal representatives for the purpose of gathering evidence in 
criminal proceedings”, SWD/2018/118 final – 2018/0108 (COD), 17 April, p. 84-85. 
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transmit it directly from their official government or law enforcement email address to the 
mailbox: exigent@apple.com with the words “Emergency Request” in the subject line. 
In the event that Apple produces customer data in response to an Emergency Government 
& Law Enforcement Information Request, a named supervisor for the government or law 
enforcement agent who submitted the Emergency Government & Law Enforcement 
Information Request may be contacted and asked to confirm to Apple that the emergency 
request was legitimate. The government or law enforcement agent who submits the 
Emergency Government & Law Enforcement Information Request should provide the 




30 See https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/law-enforcement-guidelines-outside-us.pdf.  
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3. Using the EIO for the purpose of accessing and exchanging data sought in 
criminal proceedings - Checklist for practitioners 
3.1 Checklists for judicial practitioners  
A first thing to check is the exact instrument to be used in order to channel and execute cross-
border requests for data.  In cases where requests fall within the scope of application of EU 
law, and the EU has exercised competence through the adoption of secondary legislation (EIO) 
or international agreements (MLTAs), EU instruments (and corresponding standards) should be 
given preference. 
Among participating member states, the EIO replaces previous instruments for criminal justice 
cooperation. The EIO should be used when judicial authorities in an EU member state 
participating in the EIO aim at having an investigative measure entailing access to and collection 
of electronic information executed in another EU member state participating in the EIO.  
For data requests issued in the context of intra-EU judicial proceedings, the EIO should be 
preferred to ‘direct cooperation’ with service providers abroad, given that this latter way of 
working remains voluntary to date. As far as cross-border measures targeting data held by 
service providers in another EU country, it should in fact be recalled that under the national 
legislation of all EU member states, providers of IT and telecommunication services are not 
allowed to respond to direct requests for data issued by foreign investigating and prosecuting 
authorities. 
3.1.1 Practical use and relations with other instruments 
The EIO can only be used in cases in which the requests for electronic data have evidence-
related implications. These cases exclude requests for data presenting a mere procedural 
objective (e.g. service and sending of procedural documents). In these cases, a MLA request, 
and not an EIO, should be issued. 
The EIO and the MLA request work in parallel. EIO use does not have to be restricted to 
measures covered by the Directive, but should nevertheless be avoided where it causes too 
much administrative burden (e.g. translation, etc.) on the competent authorities in the issuing 
and executing state. Notifications, for instance, are out of the scope of the EIO and must be not 
asked for through it: they have to be asked for instead through the usual channel of the MLA 
requests. 
3.1.2 Involving the competent judicial authority in the issuing state  
The EIO Directive has ‘judicialised’ the issuing phase by requiring that EIOs be issued by a judge, 
a court, an investigating judge or a public prosecutor competent in the case concerned (judicial 
authority as issuing authority). The judicialisation requirement can be also satisfied by ensuring 
that an EIO is validated by one of these authorities (judicial authority as validating authority).31 
 
31 See Article 2(c) EIO Directive. 
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When in accordance with national law of the issuing country the gathering of evidence is 
ordered by an authority different from a court, judge or prosecutor, the EIO shall be validated 
by one of these judicial authorities, which remain responsible for examining the Order’s 
conformity with the conditions for issuing an EIO.32 
The involvement of competent judicial authorities in the issuing state is important as non-
judicial authorities identified by some member states as ‘competent for issuing EIOs’ are not 
always recognised as such by all EU countries. For instance, Italy’s criminal procedural law does 
not allow UK barristers’ associations to be considered as judicial authorities. In practice, an EIO 
written by a UK barristers’ association might be considered a valid measure (and consequently 
executed) by Italian authorities, provided that it is validated by a UK court. The European 
Judicial Network (EJN)’s dedicated page on the EIO includes a useful link to identify ‘competent 
authorities’ for the purpose of issuing and executing EIOs. 
Judicial validation of data-gathering measures adopted by non-judicial issuing actors (e.g. 
police) can be crucial for the sake of EIO recognition/execution. In the absence of a judicial 
validation, EIOs might not be recognised or executed pursuant to the rule according to which 
an EIO cannot be executed in line with the procedures/modalities indicated by the issuing 
member state when they run counter the fundamental principle of the country of execution.   
Issuing authorities should not use the EIO to bypass judicial checks by authorities different from 
the one issuing the request or investigating the case, when their involvement is foreseen in 
equivalent domestic procedures. If a validation of a data-gathering measure by a judicial 
authority (different from the one investigating or prosecuting the case) is required by the law 
of the issuing state for a domestic measure equivalent to the one included in the EIO, the issuing 
authority shall seek it and obtain it, and not presume that this requirement will be fulfilled in 
the country of execution. 
Judicial scrutiny over police requests for data shall be effective, and not limited to a form of 
automatic/default validation.  
3.1.3 Formulating ‘quality requests’ 
Including the right information in the EIO Form (Annex A) is particularly important to ensure 
smooth cooperation. Issuing authorities should make sure to specify: 
• What are the facts under investigation and the measure of technological investigation 
required (production or preservation of data); 
• Who is the suspect or accused person and other individuals potentially affected; 
• Why the data requested is needed for the investigation/prosecution of the crime that 
is the object of the proceeding, and what is expected to be found through the execution 
of the measures;  
 
32 Art. 2 (c) (ii) of the EIO Directive. 
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• What is the time limit within which the data should preserved/produced. 
The issuing authority should make clear if the data-gathering measure contained in the EIO is 
established in the trial or pre-trial phase, because, depending on these circumstances, the 
executing authority could be different. Specifying whether an EIO has been issued in the pre-
trial or trial phase is also particularly important for determining if the conditions justifying the 
secrecy of an investigative measure subsist. 
During the pre-trial phase, secrecy might be justified, and its maintenance might be necessary 
until investigations are completed. In the trial phase notification is instead particularly 
important to ensure the rights and prerogatives not only of the suspected or accused person, 
but also of third parties. In the EIO Directive, it is not clearly mentioned whether in the pre-trial 
phase the suspected person or his/her lawyer can have a copy of the EIO and, in the affirmative, 
which part of it. Should there be no reason to justify secrecy of the measure requested through 
the EIO, the defence shall be put in the position to know that the data of a suspect are 
implicated in an EIO procedure. The inclusion of the judicial decision/decree accompanying the 
EIO is useful to execute the requested measures properly, having regard to guaranteeing 
fundamental rights. 
To facilitate cooperation, it is important that translations are of good quality so as to make 
requests more understandable and clear. Where available, issuing authorities should make use 
of certified interpreters. Translation costs are borne by the issuing state.  
Clear information shall also be included to motivate the necessity to maintain the secrecy of an 
EIO entailing access to and preservation of electronic information. Restrictions of an individuals’ 
rights to be informed should be limited to situations where secrecy is strictly necessary and 
proportionate to protect sensitive law enforcement information or to avoid jeopardising 
ongoing investigations. 
Exemptions to the right to be informed (which is crucial for the exercise of other criminal justice 
and data protection rights, including the right to fair trials, fair processing of the data, and 
effective remedies before a tribunal) should be not be formulated in a way that unduly prevents 
the exercise of these rights in practice, even if limited or performed by a trusted third party.  
The EIO should include provisions on the protection of the defendant’s fundamental rights, and 
an indication of what remedies are available in the issuing state. It should indicate which is the 
competent authority to receive appeals against the order. JUD-IT research has shown that, in 
practice, it is not easy for the defence to clearly establish if it is the issuing or the executing 
state. 
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3.1.4 Assessing legality, necessity and proportionality  
The judicial authorities in the issuing member state are those responsible for verifying the 
legality, necessity, and proportionality of a cross-border decision.33 Such assessments must be 
conducted by the competent judicial authorities of the issuing country against their own 
domestic legal standards, as well as in light of relevant EU primary and secondary law. 
The issuing of EIOs for minor offences should be carefully evaluated to establish whether the 
cross-border data gathering measure is proportional for obtaining the information/evidence 
needed, also in consideration of the fact that an EIO might be refused based on the absence of 
double criminality (for offences falling outside the list of crimes for which double criminality is 
abolished, and which are not punished with custodial sentences of 3 years minimum). 
The competent judicial authorities in the executing country also have a role in the assessment 
of necessity and proportionality. When “the executing authority has reason to believe that the 
conditions referred to in paragraph 1 [the issuing of the EIO is necessary and proportionate] 
have not been met, it may consult the issuing authority on the importance of executing the EIO. 
After that consultation the issuing authority may decide to withdraw the EIO”. The executing 
country may refuse the recognition/execution of an EIO via written motivation (Decree of Non-
Acceptance). 
Cases involving costs that are “deemed to be exceptionally high” in relation to the investigative 
goal pursued can be resolved through a dedicated consultation mechanism.34  
3.1.5 Transnational coordination and direct judicial contacts 
EIOs can be transmitted directly from the issuing authority to the executing authority (without 
prejudice to the designation of central authorities).35 For the identification of the competent 
executing authority and the relevant contact details, the EJN Atlas can be consulted. If an EIO 
is sent to the incorrect authority in the executing state, instead of being returned, it should be 
forwarded to the correct executing authority.36 
Direct contact and communication between the requesting and executing judicial authority is 
crucial. Regardless of who is the receiving/executing authority, coordination between 
authorities in the issuing and executing state is to be ensured. Communication is particularly 
important in instances where, according to national laws of the country of execution, the 
authority receiving an EIO cannot execute the measure. 
Depending on the nature, complexity and urgency of the case, different channels are used to 
speed up the transmission of EIOs and ensure authenticity. These include Eurojust, the EJN 
contact points and liaison magistrates. The positive role and contributions ensured by the 
 
33 See Article 6 EIO Directive. 
34 See Article 21(2) EIO Directive 
35 See Article 7 EIO Directive.  
36 See Article 7(6) EIO Directive. 
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European Judicial Network (EJN) and Eurojust have been highlighted as clear examples of 
facilitating efficient cooperation by providing contact points and information and 
communication platforms, liaising between relevant authorities, and providing training 
activities and materials. 
EIOs can be submitted via the Eurojust secure connection (for those member states that are 
connected). In such cases, however, communication is only possible between a national 
authority and Eurojust (and not between national authorities) and the EJN secure 
telecommunication connection.37 The secure connection is not, however, suitable for direct 
contact between the competent authorities. 
3.1.6 The execution of cross-border data requests under the EIO Directive 
For the EIO to be executed, a judicial decision in both the issuing and the executing state is 
necessary.  
The judicial authority in the executing state shall recognise an EIO “without any further 
formality required” and ensure its execution. The decision on the recognition or execution of 
the EIO shall be taken and the execution of the measure shall be carried out “with the same 
celerity and priority as for a national case”. The following mandatory deadlines shall be 
observed: 
• 30 days + 30 days for taking the decision on recognition or execution; 
• 90 days for undertaking the measure (after the decision on recognition or execution); 
• 24 hours from receipt of the EIO measures, if possible, in case of emergency.38 
When the validation of an EIO is required, some member states are willing, in urgent cases, to 
take some initial measures to secure evidence before the validated EIO has even been received. 
In those cases, an email is required, with a brief written summary of the facts. Furthermore, 
some member states will accept an email confirmation from the competent validating authority 
when the validating authority is not available to sign the EIO.39 
Non-recognition grounds are listed exhaustively in the EIO Directive While the EIO Directive 
does not allow for an extensive study of the file in the executing state, some checks must still 
be made.40  
While judicial decisions are presumed to comply with certain fundamental rights and rule of 
law standards, they must be reviewable. 
The executing authority must comply with the formalities and procedures expressly indicated 
by the issuing authority, but only to the extent that these are not contrary to the fundamental 
principles of law of the executing state. Execution of another EU country’s EIO is in fact 
 
37 See Article 9 of the EJN Decision, and Article 7(4) EIO Directive. 
38 See Article 32 of the EIO Directive. 
39 See EUROJUST/EJN, Joint Note on the Practical Application of the EIO. 
40 See Article 10(3) and Article 11 EIO Directive. 
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supposed to take place in the same ways and under the same modalities as if the investigative 
measure concerned had been ordered by an authority of the executing state. 
The executing authorities are supposed to perform a fundamental rights assessment to 
establish whether the execution of an EIO would unduly undermine fundamental rights 
protected under EU law. Competent authorities in the executing states are also responsible for 
ensuring that EIOs are not used for trivial offences, and can go back to the issuing authority to 
check: “Are you sure about this”? 
As a general rule the EIO requires the execution of a non-coercive measure. The executing 
authority shall not analyse if a non-coercive measure should be substituted by a less intrusive 
measure. As a general rule, the EIO establishes that recognition or execution orders requiring 
data allowing for the identification of persons holding a subscription of a specified phone 
number or IP address cannot be refused based on the objection that such measures are not 
available in the state of execution. Such a measure should exist in all member states. However, 
this does not mean that it shall be recognised automatically, nor that the general grounds for 
refusal do not apply. 
Cost-related considerations cannot be used as grounds for non-recognition.  
3.1.7 Urgent cases 
Some member states accept EIOs issued in English (instead of their own national language), for 
urgent cases. A complete list of member states that allow the exceptional derogation of 
translation requirements in urgent cases is available at the following link (under the “urgent 
matters” heading).   
Requests for data channelled through EIOs should not be labelled as “urgent” simply because 
authorities in the issuing member state would like to accelerate the case. Urgent requests for 
the execution of an EIO should be motivated by the issuing authority through the inclusion of 
information capable of proving the seriousness of the offence or the existence of other 
particularly urgent circumstances. 
Precise information that can help in proving or substantiating ‘urgency’ include: 
• Information related to the risk of data loss, and 
• Existence of a clear and imminent threat against specific people. 
Such information should be given thorough consideration and taken as much as possible into 
account by the competent authorities of the EU country of execution when processing the 
order. If an urgent request for data is made through an EIO, and the latter foresees the 
execution of several measures, coordination with other requests and measures is necessary.  
As far as ‘emergency requests’ directed toward the US are concerned, the usual process 
applies: EU member state law enforcement authorities liaise with the US authorities who, in 
turn, facilitate the voluntary provision by service providers of the required material pursuant 
to US law.  
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3.2 Role and checklist for defence lawyers 
While cross-border judicial cooperation mechanisms have been traditionally designed to 
increase the capacity of law enforcement authorities to obtain evidence to prosecute alleged 
crimes, the EIO directive is the only instrument that expressly takes the interests of the defence 
into account. This section, which builds on the results of the JUD-IT Practitioners workshop 
organised by Fair Trials in the context of the JUD-IT Project,41 focuses on the role of defence 
lawyers in MLA and EIO procedures. 
Lawyers can play an active role in respect of both (i) the request to issue an MLA or EIO request; 
(ii) challenges to the issuing of an MLA request or an EIO; and (iii) challenges to the execution 
of an MLA or EIO. Moreover, lawyers can seek to challenge the reliance on the electronic data 
obtained pursuant to an MLA request or an EIO as evidence against the accused person (see 
(iv) below). 
3.2.1 Request the issuing of an MLA request or an EIO 
When lawyers become aware that an investigation is ongoing in respect of their client, they 
should consider whether it is necessary to ensure that exculpatory electronic evidence is 
obtained, which the client cannot secure by him or herself. In practice, given the volatile nature 
of electronic data, by the time the defence finally obtains disclosure of the case file, exculpatory 
electronic data may already have been deleted.  
The EIO enables lawyers to seek access to the electronic data before it is deleted. This can be a 
key part of the defence strategy. A suspected or accused person, or by a lawyer acting on his 
behalf, may request the issuing of an EIO within the framework of applicable defence rights in 
conformity with national criminal procedure.42 The EIO directive does not specify the process 
and instead leaves it up to the national criminal procedure of the issuing state. In the absence 
of a specified procedure in national law, lawyers can rely directly on the EIO directive to apply 
for an EIO in the competent court of the issuing state. 
The traditional MLA system does not recognise the possibility for defence practitioners to 
request cross-border electronic data. Instead, national law will determine to what extent the 
defence may apply to the authorities to request international cooperation. However, 
informally, the defence can ask the competent national authorities to send a letter of request 
to have investigations carried out in another state even where they do not have a legal right to 
this. The defence will need to demonstrate in detail how the data requested is relevant to the 
case, that it is necessary and proportionate in order to conduct the defence, as well as specify 
what data needs to be obtained, where the data is stored and who holds it.  
 
41 Fair Trials Europe (2019), ‘Policy Brief: The impact on the procedural rights of defendants of cross-border access 
to data through judicial cooperation in criminal matters’, Available at https://fairtrials.org/sites/default/files/JUD-
IT-Fair-Trials-Policy-Brief-October-2018.pdf.  
42 Article 1(3) of the EIO Directive. 
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3.2.2 Challenging the issuing of an MLA or EIO request 
Defence lawyers can also challenge the lawfulness of an MLA request or EIO when it is issued, 
where they are aware of such a request by law enforcement authorities. In particular, the EIO 
requires law enforcement authorities to seek judicial authorisation, and for the competent 
judicial authority to conduct a proportionality and necessity assessment against the 
fundamental rights of the defendant before issuing an EIO. Provided the defence is notified 
that law enforcement authorities are seeking to make a cross-border request for data, lawyers 
can take this opportunity to challenge the proportionality and necessity of an EIO. 
Even if law enforcement authorities have the legal power to gather electronic data, because of 
the impact this has on the right to private and family life, Article 8 ECHR requires that these 
powers should only be used when it is proportionate to do so. One practical aspect of the 
principle of proportionality is the requirement that there is a sound basis to justify the request 
for electronic data. A vague and unsubstantiated suspicion that a person may have committed 
a criminal offence should not be enough.  
3.2.3 Challenging the execution of an MLA or EIO request 
In traditional judicial cooperation mechanisms, the involvement of a judicial authority in the 
state that is asked to gather the evidence may provide an additional check on the legality of the 
evidence gathering, and an opportunity for lawyers to submit evidence that the request should 
not be executed.  
The EIO is the first instrument to include a risk to fundamental rights as legitimate grounds to 
refuse the execution of an EIO. Therefore, an EIO may be refused in the executing state where 
“there are substantial grounds to believe that the execution of the investigative measure 
indicated in the EIO would be incompatible with the executing State's obligations in accordance 
with Article 6 TEU and the Charter”.43 In this respect, please refer to Annex II for some guidance 
on risks to fundamental rights that arise in the context of electronic data. 
3.2.4 Challenging the probity or admissibility of the data obtained under the MLA or EIO 
procedure as evidence at trial 
Once cross-border data has been obtained by the issuing state, the prosecution may seek to 
rely upon it as evidence against an accused person. Defence lawyers may have an opportunity 
to challenge the probity or admissibility of the evidence on which the prosecution is seeking to 
rely, for instance, on the grounds that the data contains legally privileged information.  
Lawyer may face difficulties in this respect. For instance, it may be difficult to obtain 
information on how that evidence was gathered and to understand whether this was done in 
violation of local law or in a way which undermines its reliability. Lawyers can actively seek 
disclosure of the electronic data and how it was obtained. In this respect, the EU Directive on 
the right to information in criminal proceedings44 enshrines the right to access all material 
 
43 Articles 1(4), 6(1) (a), and 11 (1) (d) and (f) of the EIO Directive. 
44 Directive 2012/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2012 on the right to information 
in criminal proceedings. 
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evidence in possession of the competent authorities in due time to allow the exercise of the 
rights of the defence (Article 7).  
Reviewing electronic data is a time-consuming and onerous task, especially when the defence 
has limited resources and a client is in detention and cannot assist with the review of the data, 
creating a risk that potentially relevant data is overlooked. These challenges can be exacerbated 
by the quantity of electronic data defence lawyers are given. In this respect, it may be possible 
to apply for legal aid and/or for lawyers to obtain specialist technical support or training. 
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Annex I – Glossary 
The definitions of the categories of public authorities and data provided in the glossary below 
are intended solely for the purposes of this Handbook. They do not coincide with definitions of 
more general concepts developed in EU law, e.g. independent judicial authority, or issuing 





Judicial authorities who are independent from the executive branch and who 
exercise judicial oversight functions in the pre-trial phase, as well as 
independent judicial actors responsible for admitting and/or evaluating 
evidence in the trial phase. This definition does not encompass administrative 
authorities such as ministries or police authorities, which are “within the 




Judicial or administrative authorities with the competence to order the 
gathering of information as part of a criminal investigation, and who are 
responsible for coordinating criminal investigations and/or representing the 
prosecution in a criminal trial. 
Law enforcement 
authorities (LEAs) 
Governmental police authorities involved in criminal investigations; depending 
on the specific national framework of reference, this category might also 
include specialised law enforcement agencies (customs, anti-fraud, etc.). LEAs 
do not include intelligence or security services. In some member states, where 
prosecutors do not qualify as an independent judicial authority and may even 
be considered part of the executive, LEAs could also include prosecutors.  
Central authorities Representatives of the executive branch dealing with the issuing of cross-border 
requests and/or responsible for the processing (e.g. transmission or translation) 
of incoming foreign requests for access to data for criminal proceedings. This 
category includes liaison magistrates/prosecutors who are seconded abroad 
(e.g. to the foreign ministry by the justice ministry) and responsible for 
facilitating and advising on matters concerning mutual legal assistance in 











Content data The content exchanged by means of electronic communications services, such 
as text, voice, images and sound.45 While content data include both stored and 
intercept (i.e. data from real-time interception of telecommunications) 
electronic communications content, the Commission has stressed that intercept 
data are out of the scope of the proposal. However, discussions within the 
Council suggest that the scope of the proposed regulation could be expanded 
to also cover this type of data (live interception).46  
Non-content data Metadata Data processed in an electronic communications network for 
the purpose of transmitting, distributing or exchanging 
electronic communications content. Metadata encompasses 
data used to trace and identify the source and destination of 
a communication; data on the location of the device 
generated in the context of providing electronic 
communications services; and the date, time, duration and 
type of communication.47 Metadata also includes, for 




Information that allows the identification of a subscriber to a 
service. Examples are the subscriber’s name, address and 
telephone number.49 
Access logs Information that records the time and date an individual 




Information that identifies products or services an individual 
has obtained from a provider or a third party (e.g. a purchase 
of cloud storage space).51 
 
45 Article 4(3)(b) of the proposal for a Regulation concerning the respect for private life and the protection of 
personal data in electronic communications and repealing Directive 2002/58/EC (Regulation on Privacy and 
Electronic Communications) (European Commission, 2017c). 
46 See Council of the European Union (2018b), p. 3. 
47 Ibid., Article 4(3)(c). 
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Annex II - EU data protection and criminal justice standards (Selected CJEU jurisprudence)  




The member states may not impose a general obligation to retain data on providers of electronic communications 
services. 
• EU law precludes a general and indiscriminate retention of traffic data and location data, but it is open to member 
states to make provision, as a preventive measure, for targeted retention of that data solely for the purpose of 
fighting serious crime, provided that such retention is, with respect to the categories of data to be retained, the 
means of communication affected, the persons concerned and the chosen duration of retention, limited to what is 
strictly necessary. Access by national authorities to the retained data must be subject to conditions, including prior 
review by an independent authority and the data being retained within the EU. 
• The Court noted that the national legislation “provides for a general and indiscriminate retention of all traffic and 
location data of all subscribers and registered users relating to all means of electronic communication, and that it 
imposes on providers of electronic communications services an obligation to retain that data systematically and 
continuously, with no exceptions”.52 
• The Court considers it important that national law safeguards professional secrecy53 and criticised the fact that 
national law was “not restricted to retention in relation to (i) data pertaining to a particular time period and/or 
geographical area and/or a group of persons likely to be involved, in one way or another, in a serious crime, or (ii) 
persons who could, for other reasons, contribute, through their data being retained, to fighting crime”.54 
Retention of PNR data 
(Opinion 1/15) 
• The CJEU differentiates between different stages of retention and use of PNR data: (i) retention and use before 
arrival; (ii) retention and use during passengers’ stay; (iii) retention and use after a passengers’ departure.  
 
52 Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15 Tele 2 and Watson, para. 97. 
53 Ibid., para. 104-105.  
54 Ibid., para. 106. 
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• Retention and use before arrival: viewing the PNR system as one that “facilitates security checks and border control 
checks”, the Court found that the retention of data up to the departure from Canada is proportionate in relation to 
all air passengers; 
• Retention and use during passengers’ stay: the use of passenger data must be based on new circumstances justifying 
the use, in particular “substantive and procedural conditions governing that use in order […] to protect that data 
against the risk of abuse”; here, the Court requires objective evidence that PNR data must constitute an effective 
contribution to the combating of terrorism or other serious crimes and highlights the need for prior judicial approval 
or approval of an independent administrative body; 
• Retention and use during passengers’ stay: retention and use of PNR data after a passengers’ departure was deemed 
to not fulfil the purpose of entry and exit checks at the border anymore; here, the Court opined that such retention 
of data is disproportionate; only in specific cases, where “objective evidence is identified from which it may be 
inferred that certain air passengers may present a risk in terms of the fight against terrorism and serious transnational 
crime even after their departure from Canada, it seems permissible to store their PNR data beyond their stay in 
Canada”.55 
Security of retained 
data and localisation of 
data (Tele 2) 
• The Court stressed, first, that national legislation should provide for the data to be retained within the European 
Union and for the irreversible destruction of the data at the end of the data retention period. The Court did not 
follow the suggestion by the Advocate General that a member state could reasonably go further and require that the 
data be stored within the national territory, especially in the absence of coordination of national authorities within 
the European Union.56 
Data transfers in the 
law enforcement 
domain and adequacy 
of third countries 
• Art. 34 of Directive 2016/680 introduces the ‘adequacy’ standard in relation to the law enforcement domain. Transfer 
of personal data from the EU to a third country is possible for third countries that are deemed adequate. In this 
context, existing bilateral agreements between an EU member state and third countries are to remain unaffected 
until amended (Art. 61). Adequacy decisions currently in place do not cover data exchanges in the law enforcement 
sector.57 
 
55 Opinion 1/15 of 26 July 2017, para. 207. 
56 Opinion of Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe in Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15 Tele 2 and Watson, para. 241. 
57 European Commission, ‘Adequacy decisions’, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/international-dimension-data-protection/adequacy-decisions_en.  
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Key standards stemming from the Court rulings for checking legality on Independent justice and effective judicial control in mutual recognition in 
criminal justice 
Prior review of judicial 
body or independent 
administrative body 
• Prior review of the conditions of access to private electronic data is indispensable, both in cases regarding PNR data 
and telecommunications data; access to this data is conditional on the authorisation of a judicial body or independent 
administrative body. 
• According to the Court in Digital Rights Ireland, access must be reviewed “by a court or by an independent 
administrative body whose decision seeks to limit access to the data and their use to what is strictly necessary for 
the purpose of attaining the objective pursued and which intervenes following a reasoned request of those 
authorities submitted within the framework of procedures of prevention, detection or criminal prosecutions”.58 
• In Tele 2, the Court the Court stressed the need to ensure review of compliance by an independent supervisory 
authority, as required under Article 8(3) of the Charter. This constitutes, in accordance with the Court’s settled case 
law, an “essential element” of the right to protection of personal data and makes it possible for persons whose 
personal data was retained to complain to the national supervisory authority seeking the protection of their data.59 
Access to that data by 
the authorities (Tele 2) 
• Applying the principle of proportionality to the area of prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of 
criminal offences, the Court reiterated that only the objective of fighting serious crime is capable of justifying access 
to the retained data. 
• Applying the principle of necessity, the Court found that a general access to all retained data, regardless of whether 
there is any link, at least indirect, with the intended purpose, cannot be regarded as limited to what is strictly 
necessary. In this respect, the Court cited the ECtHR ruling in Zakharov v Russia,60 where the ECtHR underlined the 
need for there to be a “reasonable suspicion” against the persons concerned. 
• In order to ensure that the above conditions are fully respected, the Court required that access to retained data 
should be subject to a prior review carried out either by a court or by an independent administrative body on the 
basis of a reasoned request by the investigating authorities. The Court specifically referred to the ruling of the ECtHR 
 
58 Joined cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v. Ireland, para. 62. 
59 Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15 Tele 2 and Watson, para. 122-123. 
60 ECtHR, Roman Zakharov v Russia (application no. 47143/06), 4 December 2015, para. 260. 
38 | MARCO STEFAN 
 
in Szabó and Vissy v Hungary61 that “in this field, control by an independent body, normally a judge with special 
expertise, should be the rule”, except in cases of urgency. 
Right to legal remedy 
of individuals under 
investigation (Tele 2) 
• The Court stressed that the legislation should provide that the competent national authorities should notify the 
persons affected “as soon as this is no longer liable to jeopardise the investigations being undertaken by those 
authorities”. Such notification is necessary to enable these persons to exercise their right to a legal remedy.62 
  
 
61 ECtHR, Szabó and Vissy v Hungary (Application no. 37138/14), 12 January 2016, para. 80. 
62 Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15 Tele 2 and Watson, para. 121. 
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• Basic Law on the General Rights of Nationals63 
o Article 9, para 1: “The rights of the home are inviolable.” 
o Article 10: “The privacy of letters may not be infringed and the seizure of letters may, except in 
case of a legal detention or domiciliary visit, take place only in times of war or by reason of a judicial 
warrant in conformity with existent laws.” 
o Article 10a: “[1] Telecommunications secrecy may not be infringed. [2] Exceptions to the provisions 
of the foregoing paragraph are admissible only by reason of a judicial warrant in conformity with 
existent laws.” 
• Personal Liberty Act64 
o Article 1, para 2: “No one may be arrested or detained on grounds other than those named in this 
Federal constitutional law or in a manner other than in accordance with the procedure prescribed 
by law.” 
o Article 2, para 1, explicitly provides for instances in which persons may be deprived of their liberty. 
Secondary 
sources 
•  Criminal Code65 
o Articles 118–120 provide for crimes aiming at the protection of persons’ private sphere. Those who 
infringe the secrecy of correspondence (Article 118), a computer system (Article 118a), or 
telecommunication secrecy (Article 119), as well as abusively intercept data (Article 119a) or apply 
sound recording or listening devices (Article 120), will be punished accordingly. 
 
63 Staatsgrundgesetz vom 21. December 1867, über die allgemeinen Rechte der Staatsbürger für die im Reichsrathe vertretenen Königreiche und Länder, RGBl. Nr. 142/1867.  
64 Bundesverfassungsgesetz vom 29. November 1988 über den Schutz der persönlichen Freiheit, BGBl. Nr. 684/1988. 
65 Bundesgesetz vom 23. Jänner 1974 über die mit gerichtlicher Strafe bedrohten Handlungen (Strafgesetzbuch – StGB), BGBl. Nr. 60/1974. 
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o Article 126c criminalises the creation and the making available of any computer programme or 
access code whereby it is possible to commit crimes linked to computer secrecy (out of the 
foregoing, those stipulated in Articles 118a–119). 
• Code of Criminal Procedure66 
o Article 47a: appointment and legal status of the legal protection representative 
(Rechtsschutzbeauftragte). 
o Article 76a, para 1: communication service providers’ obligation to provide master data related to 
subscribers.  
o Article 135: conditions of seizure of letters, providing information on communication, localisation 
of technical devices, data storage, and monitoring of messages. 
o Article 147, para 1, point 5: the legal protection representative is responsible for the examination 
and control of the order, approval, authorisation, and execution of the monitoring of 
communication, localisation of technical devices, providing information on traffic data, access data, 
and location data, and temporary data storage. 
• Other relevant legislation  
• Security Police Act67 
• Data Protection Act68  
• Telecommunication Act69 
• Police State Security Act70 
• Decree on Interception71 
• Decree on Interception Costs72 
• Decree on the Assessment of Investment Costs73 
 
66 Strafprozeßordnung, BGBl. Nr. 631/1975.  
67 Bundesgesetz über die Organisation der Sicherheitsverwaltung und die Ausübung der Sicherheitspolizei (Sicherheitspolizeigesetz – SPG), BGBl. Nr. 566/1991. 
68 Bundesgesetz zum Schutz natürlicher Personen bei der Verarbeitung personenbezogener Daten (Datenschutzgesetz – DSG), BGBl. I Nr. 165/1999. 
69 Bundesgesetz, mit dem ein Telekommunikationsgesetz erlassen wird (Telekommunikationsgesetz 2003 – TKG 2003), BGBl. I Nr. 70/2003 
70 Bundesgesetz über die Organisation, Aufgaben und Befugnisse des polizeilichen Staatsschutzes (Polizeiliches Staatsschutzgesetz – PStSG), BGBl. I Nr. 5/2016. 
71 Verordnung der Bundesministerin für Verkehr, Innovation und Technologie über die Überwachung des Fernmeldeverkehrs (Überwachungsverordnung – ÜVO), BGBl. II Nr. 418/2001. 
72 Verordnung der Bundesministerin für Justiz über den Ersatz der Kosten der Anbieter für die Mitwirkung an der Auskunft über Daten einer Nachrichtenübermittlung, der Auskunft über Vorratsdaten und der Überwachung 
von Nachrichten (Überwachungskostenverordnung – ÜKVO), BGBl. II Nr. 322/2004. 
73 Verordnung der Bundesministerin für Verkehr, Innovation und Technologie über den Ersatz der Investitionskosten der Anbieter für die Bereitstellung der Einrichtungen, die zur Auskunft über Daten einer 
Nachrichtenübermittlung einschließlich der Auskunft über Vorratsdaten erforderlich sind (Investitionskostenersatzverordnung – IKEV), BGBl. II Nr. 107/2012. 











o Articles 12, 13 and 14 of Belgian Constitution (in relation to the rights to the rights to freedom and 
fair trial) 
o Article 15 (inviolability of the home), Article 22 (private and family life), and Article 29 
(confidentiality of communications) of Belgian Constitution. 
Other 
provisions 
Belgian Code of Criminal Procedure 
o Articles 46bis, 88bis, 90ter and 90quater of the Belgian Code of Criminal Procedure. 
Other relevant legislation 
• Article 13 of the Loi du 9 décembre 2004 sur la transmission policière internationale de données à caractère 
personnel et d'informations à finalité judiciaire, l'entraide judiciaire internationale en matière pénale et 
modifiant l'article 90ter du Code d'instruction criminelle. 
• Loi relative à la décision d'enquête européenne en matière pénale, of 22 May 2017. 
Case law • Cass. 4 January 1994, Arresten van het Hof van Cassatie 1994, n° 1. 
• Hof van Cassatie van België (Court of Cassation of Belgium), Nr. P.13.2082.N. of 1 December 2015. 
• Correctionele Rechtbank van Antwerpen, afdeling Mechelen of Belgium, No. ME20.F1.105151-12 of 27 October 2016. 
 
  








Bulgarian Constitution  
• Articles 30-34 of the Constitution of Bulgaria contain provisions on the rights to privacy, freedom and 
confidentiality of correspondence, as well as the right to a fair trial and the exceptional conditions under 
which they may be infringed upon. 
Secondary 
sources 
Bulgarian Criminal Code 
o Article 171  
(1) A person who contrary to the law: 
1. […] 
2. […] 
3. becomes aware of the content of an electronic message not addressed to him/her or prevents such a 
message from reaching its original addressee, shall be punished by imprisonment for up to one year or by 
a fine from BGN one hundred to three hundred. 
(2) If the act was perpetrated by an official who availed himself of his official position, the punishment shall 
by imprisonment for up to two years, and the court may also rule deprivation of the right under Article 37 
(1), sub-paragraph 6. 
(3) A person who, by use of special technical means, unlawfully obtains information not addressed to him, 
communicated over the telephone, telegraph, computer network or another telecommunication means, 
shall be punished by imprisonment for up to two years. 
[…] 
o Article 171a 
(1) A person who unlawfully acquires, stores, discloses or disseminates data as those collected, processed, 
kept or used as per the Electronic Communications Act, shall be punished by imprisonment up to three 
years or probation. 
[…] 
o Article 319a - Cybercrime 
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(1) Anyone who copies, uses or obtains access to computer data in a computer system without permission, 
where such is required, shall be punished by a fine from up to BGN 3,000. 
(2) […] 
(3) […] 
(4) Where acts under paragraphs 1 - 3 have been committed with regard to information that qualifies as a 
state secret or to another information protected by the law, the punishment shall be imprisonment from 
one to three years, unless severer punishment has been envisaged. 
(5) Where grave consequences have occurred as a result of the acts under Paragraph 4, punishment shall 
be of one to eight years. 
If law enforcement activities are conducted “according to law”, and not “contrary to law”, “unlawfully” or 
“without permission, where such is required”, these provisions are not applicable. 
Bulgarian Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) 
o Articles 159-163 contain provisions on searches and seizures; e-data is explicitly mentioned as a 
potential ‘target’ of such investigative measures. 
o Articles 172-177 contain provisions on Special Investigation Means, including interception of 
communications. 
o Articles 193 et seq. contain provisions on pre-trial investigations and the authorities in charge 
thereof.  
o The admissibility of e-data as evidence may be challenged according to general provisions regarding 
the admissibility of evidence during the pre-trial phase, court proceedings in the first instance, on 
appeal (articles 359-360 CPC) or during the cassation procedure [article 348(1) CCP].  
o Articles 471 et seq. contain provisions on MLAT-based letters rogatory, which still apply to non-EIO 
international judicial cooperation requests. A centralised model is followed. 
Other relevant legislation  
• European Investigative Order Act (State Gazette, No. 16/20.02.2018) 
• Electronic Communications Act (Stage Gazette No. 41/22.05.2007, repeatedly amended ever since) 
• Special Intelligence Means Act (State Gazette No. 95/21.10.1997, repeatedly amended ever since) 








Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany 
o Article 1, para 3, stipulates that “[t]he […] basic rights [as provided for in the Basic Law] shall bind the legislature, 
the executive and the judiciary as directly applicable law.” 
o Article 2, para 1: “Every person shall have the right to free development of his personality insofar as he does not 
violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral law.” 
o Article 10: “(1) The privacy of correspondence, posts and telecommunications shall be inviolable. (2) Restrictions 
may be ordered only pursuant to a law. If the restriction serves to protect the free democratic basic order or the 
existence or security of the Federation or of a Land, the law may provide that the person affected shall not be 
informed of the restriction and that recourse to the courts shall be replaced by a review of the case by agencies 
and auxiliary agencies appointed by the legislature.” 
Secondary 
sources 
•  Criminal Code74 
o Article 201 protects the privacy of the spoken word by, inter alia, criminalising the “unlawful […] overhear[ing] with an 
eavesdropping device the privately spoken words of another not intended for his attention”. 
o Article 202a penalises if one “unlawfully obtains data for himself or another that were not intended for him and 
were especially protected against unauthorised access, if he has circumvented the protection”. 
o Article 202b provides that [w]hosoever unlawfully intercepts data […] not intended for him, for himself or 
another, by technical means from a non-public data processing facility or from the electromagnetic broadcast of 
a data processing facility, shall be liable to [phishing]”. 
o Article 202c penalises acts preparatory to data espionage (Article 202a) and phishing (Article 202b). 
o Article 206 sanctions the “unlawful […] disclos[ure] to another person facts which are subject to the postal or 
telecommunications secret and which became known to [the perpetrator] as the owner or employee of an 
enterprise in the business of providing postal or telecommunications services”. 
• Code of Criminal Procedure75 
o Articles 94–98: provisions on seizure, out of which, Articles 97–98 relate to those which may not, or may with 
restrictions, be subject to seizure. 
 
74 Strafgesetzbuch, BGBl. I S. 3322. 
75 Strafprozeßordnung, BGBl. I S. 1074, 1319. 
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o Article 100a enumerates the conditions of when “[t]elecommunications may be intercepted and recorded also 
without the knowledge of the persons concerned” (Article 100a, para 1). 
o Article 100b: authorities are allowed to have access to information on mobile devices before it is encrypted. Such 
measure must be applied by the public prosecution office and ordered by a court. 
o Articles 100c and 100f provide the opportunity of secret interception and recording of “private speech on private 
premises” (Article 100c) and words spoken in a “non-public context outside private premises” (Article 100f). 
o Article 100g: the public prosecutor’s office and, in relation to tax offences, the tax authority are empowered to 
acquire certain traffic data related to customer communications, as well as to request the disclosure and, if 
necessary, the seizure of stored communications. 
o Articles 102–110 contain the rules and methods for conducting searches. According to Article 105, “[s]earches 
may be ordered only by the judge and, in exigent circumstances, also by the public prosecution office and the 
officials assisting it”. 
Other relevant legislation  
• Federal Police Act76  
• Act on the Restriction of the Security of Correspondence, Postal, and Telecommunications (Article 10 Act)77 
• Customs Investigations Services Act78 
• Telecommunication Act79 
• Act on the Federal Intelligence Service80  
• Federal Criminal Police Office Act81 
• Telecommunications Interception Ordinance82 
• Technical Directive83 
Case law • Judgement of 21 February 1964, BGHSt 19 325 
• Judgement of 31 January 1973, BVerfG 2 BvR 454/71 
• Judgement of 18 April 1980, BGH 2 StR 731/79 
• Judgement of 14 July 1999, 100, BVerfG 
• Judgement of 16 March 2005, 113, BVerfGE 
• Judgement of 4 April 2006, 115, BVerfGE 
• Judgement of 22 June 2017, 13 B 238/17 
 
76 Gesetz über die Bundespolizei, BGBl. I S. 2978, 2979. 
77 Gesetz zur Beschränkung des Brief-, Post- und Fernmeldegeheimnisses, BGBl. I S. 1254, 2298; 2007 I S. 154. Also referred to as: Artikel 10-Gesetz. 
78 Gesetz über das Zollkriminalamt und die Zollfahndungsämter, BGBl. I S. 3202. 
79 Telekommunikationsgesetz, BGBl. I S. 1190. 
80 Gesetz zur Ausland-Ausland-Fernmeldeaufklärung des Bundesnachrichtendienstes, BGBl. I 2016 S. 3346. 
81 Gesetz über das Bundeskriminalamt und die Zusammenarbeit des Bundes und der Länder in kriminalpolizeilichen Angelegenheiten, BGBl. I S. 1354.  
82 Verordnung über die technische und organisatorische Umsetzung von Maßnahmen zur Überwachung der Telekommunikation, BGBl. I S. 2316. 
83 Technische Richtlinie zur Umsetzung gesetzlicher Maßnahmen zur Überwachung der Telekommunikation, Erteilung von Auskünften. 








French Constitution  
• France’s 1958 Constitution does not include specific provisions related to personal data protection or 
privacy guarantees.  
• Article 55 French Constitution imposes - par ricochet - the protection to the rights of privacy and data 
protection, as recognised respectively under the EU Charter of Fundamental rights (and EU law more in 
general), as well as under the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Secondary 
sources 
• Criminal Code 
o Article 368 criminalises “listening, recording, or transmitting by means of any device whatever words 
pronounced in a private place by a person without that person’s consent” if “done with intent to infringe 
on the intimacy of another's private life.” No explicit exception for law enforcement activities. 
• French Code of Criminal Procedure 
o Art. 10: provides a functional definition of persons accused in criminal proceedings i.e. all “persons 
against whom there exist grave and concordant indications of guilt”. 
o Art. 56-1/56-5: access to and gathering of data concerning certain categories of places and/or individuals 
such as lawyers, doctors, journalists and media outlets (e.g. direct involvement of judicial authorities and 
express ex ante consent of the data subject required). 
o Art. 57-1: establishes conditions for access to data through perquisitions and requisitions (i.e. search and 
seizures) directed at investigating facts related to crimes and délits flagrants. 
o Art. 57-1, para 3: collection of data located outside the national territory might occur at the hand of the 
officier de police judiciaire (OPJ) subject to the conditions for request and access provided for in the 
applicable international engagement. 
o Art. 60-1: information (including data from a computer system, or data processing of personal data). The 
addressee of such request must make the requested information available, and refusal to comply with 
the measure results in a pecuniary sanction. 
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o Art. 60-2 para 2: preservation order for content data under retained for a period not exceeding one year 
(prior authorisation from the judge of freedoms and detention required, see also Art. 77-1).  
o Article 76 para 2: searches and seizures of computer data by OPJ in the context of an enquête préliminaire 
(only possible upon prior authorisation by the public prosecutor). 
o Article 76 para 4: production and preservation of data ordered without the consent of the person 
concerned (only when necessary for the investigation concerns a crime or délit punishable by 
imprisonment for a term of three years; express request the public prosecutor to be validated by the 
judge of freedoms and detention of the court of first instance). 
o Article 97: gathering or preservation of electronic information in the context of the information judiciaire 
(computer data which is “necessary for the manifestation of the truth”, is seized and placed in the hand 
of the judicial authorities responsible for the instruction of case). 
o Art. 694-15: EIO replaces the corresponding provisions of previously adopted mutual legal assistance 
treaties. 
o Article 694-20: EIOs originating from France must emanate directly by a judicial authority. 
o Art. 694-23: The competent French judicial authorities forward the measure they issue directly to the 
competent authority designated by the executing state. The Ministry of Justice, acting as central authority 
for EIO, may also assist in the transfer of the orders and supports issuing authorities with any other 
difficulty they face. 
o Article 694-29: All orders (including those requiring gathering or preservation of data) transmitted to and 
received by French authorities must be issued or validated by a judicial authority. 
o Article 694-30: The executing French authorities are respectively, the Procureur de la République or the 
juge d'instruction of the tribunal de grande instance territorially competent for its execution. If an EIO 
concerns the execution of investigative measures for which - under French criminal procedural law - a 
prior authorisation by an independent judge (e.g. “the judge of the freedoms and detention”) is required, 
its recognition and execution will occur at the hand of the investigating judge. 
o Article 694-31: Grounds for non-recognising or executing an EIO to be raised by the judicial authority 
competent for recognition include inter alia privilege and immunity; ne bis in idem; fundamental rights; 
requests targeting classified information; absence of dual criminality for non-serious crime. 
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o Art. 694-33: Incoming EIOs directed at obtaining information related to the identification of subscribers 
with a specific phone number or persons with a specific IP address cannot lead to non-recognition or non-
execution decisions by French executing authorities. 
o Art. 694-34: The French Minister of Justice may decide that an EIO from another EU country is not given 
recognition or execution when it considers it detrimental to fundamental national security interests, or if 
it finds that the EIO poses risks to a source of information; or if the order envisages the collection of 
classified information). 
o Article D. 32-2-1: Ministry of Justice (Office for International Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters) might 
provide technical or legal assistance in cases where any difficulties are encountered by the national 
judicial authority or the foreign authority. 
 
Other relevant legislation  
• Loi 2006-64 du 23 janvier 2006 relative à la lutte contre le terrorisme et portant dispositions diverses 
relatives à la sécurité et aux contrôles frontaliers 
• Loi 2013-1168 du 18 décembre 2013 relative à la programmation militaire pour les années 2014 à 2019 et 
portant diverses dispositions concernant la défense et la sécurité nationale 
• Loi 2015-1501 du 20 novembre 2015 prorogeant l'application de la loi n° 55-385 relative à l'état d'urgence 
et renforçant l'efficacité de ses dispositions 
• Loi 2015-912 du 24 juillet 2015 relative au renseignement 
• Loi 2017-1510 du 30 octobre 2017 renforçant la sécurité intérieure et la lutte contre le terrorisme. 
 
Case law French Constitutional Court, Decision no. 2016-536 QPC, 19 February 2016 
French Constitutional Court, Decision no. 2005-532 QPC, 19 January 2006. 
European Court Human Rights (ECtHR), Medvedyev et al v France, Judgment of 29 March 2010 (Grand Chamber, Application No 
3394/03). 
  









• Article 9bis (“9A”) of the Greek Constitution (as introduced by virtue of the 2001 Constitutional 
Amendment) provides for an individual right to the protection of personal data in the following words: “All 
persons have the right to be protected from the collection, processing and use, especially by electronic 
means, of their personal data, as specified by law. The protection of personal data is ensured by an 
independent authority, which is constituted and operates as specified by law”. The said provision 
prescribes a (negative) right, which aims at confining the state (and other public entities) in its use of the 
personal data of its citizens. Concomitants of this right are the rights to deny (or consent to) the collection 
and processing of one’s personal data, as well as the right to be informed of any processing of data. The 
reference “especially to electronic means” connotes that other means of collection or processing are also 
restricted under the Constitution. 
• Article 19 of the Greek Constitution (as amended by virtue of the 2001 Constitutional Amendment) 
establishes (i) the absolute inviolability of all forms of communication, and (ii) a (presumably absolute) 
prohibition of the use of evidence acquired in breach thereof in the following words: “1. Secrecy of letters 
and all other forms of free correspondence or communication shall be absolutely inviolable. The guaranties 
under which the judicial authority shall not be bound by this secrecy for reasons of national security or for 
the purpose of investigating especially serious crimes, shall be specified by law. 2. Matters relating to the 
constitution, the operation and the functions of the independent authority ensuring the secrecy of 
paragraph 1 shall be specified by law. 3. Use of evidence acquired in violation of the present article and of 
articles 9 and 9A is prohibited”. 
• Other pertinent (albeit indirectly) provisions of the Greek Constitution: Article 5A (introduced by virtue of 
the 2001 amendment), which establishes the right to information; Article 9, providing that “every person’s 
home is a sanctuary”; and Article 28, establishing a hierarchy between international law and domestic 
legislation. 
 




• Criminal Code 
o Article 370bis (“370A”) of the Greek Criminal Code criminally proscribes: (a) surveillance, recording, 
etc. of any form of distance communication or the mere tapping of any telephone device absent the 
consent of everyone participating in the communication [sec. 1]; (b) surveillance, recording, etc. of any 
other form of private communication and/or any private act(s) absent the consent of everyone 
participating or involved therein [sec. 2]; (c) the use of any recorded material(s) by any person [sec. 3]. 
The provision also introduces aggravated circumstances, e.g. for certain classes of offenders such as 
private investigators [sec. 4]. 
o Articles 370ter (“370B”), 370quater (“370Γ”), 370quinquies (“370Δ”), and 370sexies (“370E”) of the 
Greek Criminal Code (as recently amended and/or introduced) criminally proscribe various forms of 
unauthorised access to information systems or e-data. Although there is no significant body of case 
law concerning the said provisions, their presence is expected to become more “visible” in the 
immediate future. 
o Article 371 of the Greek Criminal Code criminally proscribes breach of various forms of professional 
confidentiality (e.g. attorney-client confidentiality). Under paragraph 4 of the said provision, the 
proscribed act is justified if carried out to avoid conflict with vital interests (public or private). 
* Following the enactment of the new Criminal Code [Statute No. 4619/2019, in force since 1 July 2019], all the above 
offences (even in their aggravated forms) are now proscribed as misdemeanours (they were proscribed as felonies 
under the former Criminal Code). 
** Although the said provisions themselves do not provide for an explicit exception covering law enforcement activities, 
such forms of surveillance/interception shall be justified based on a combination of Article 20 of the Criminal Code and 
the pertinent procedural provisions explicitly delimiting the authorities’ prerogatives in investigating various forms of 
crime (see infra). 
• Code of Criminal Procedure  
o Article 177 section 2 provides that unlawfully obtained evidence shall not be used in criminal 
proceedings. Evidence obtained in breach of the provisions protecting privacy/e-data is a paradigmatic 
case of unlawfully obtained evidence in the above sense. 
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o Article 178 section 2 introduces the explicit obligation of judicial and prosecutorial authorities to seek 
and take into account all types of evidence, including exculpatory evidence, throughout criminal 
proceedings. 
o Article 212 introduces an exclusionary rule concerning witness testimony which would be in breach of 
confidentiality (under the new Code of Criminal Procedure, explicit reference is made to article 371 of 
the Criminal Code). 
o Article 254 applies to specific violent offences (including organised crime and terrorism), allowing for 
measures such as interception of e-data, real-time surveillance, lifting of confidentiality, and various 
forms of processing personal data. 
o Article 255 applies to corruption offences and also provides for similar measures. Again, competence lies 
with the Pre-Trial Chamber or the Prosecutor in cases of extreme urgency. 
o Article 265 introduces (for the first time as of July 2019) explicit provisions concerning the confiscation 
of digital data. 
o Article 362 concerns the admission of documents (including e-documents) to trial. 
o Article 458 regulates the filing of requests of evidence in the context of judicial assistance. The said 
provision applies alongside any applicable bilateral or multilateral treaty in force. 
o Article 459 regulates the reception of requests of evidence in the context of judicial assistance. The said 
provision applies alongside any applicable bilateral or multilateral treaty in force. 
Other pertinent legislation  
• Statute No. 4624/2019 (the new Greek Statute concerning personal data, replacing Statute No. 
2472/1997). 
• Statute No. 4579/2018 transposing Directive (EU) 2016/681 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 27 April 2016 on the use of passenger name record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, 
investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime. 
• Statute No. 4489/2017 transposing the EIO Directive. 
• Statute No. 4070/2012 concerning the regulation of telecommunications. 
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• Statute No. 3917/2011 concerning retention of data. 
• Statute No. 3783/2009 concerning the identification of the users of telecommunications services. 
• Statute No. 3471/2006 entitled “Protection of personal data and privacy in the electronic 
telecommunications sector and amendment of law 2472/1997”. 
• Statute No. 3251/2004 transposing the Framework-Decision concerning the European Arrest Warrant. 
• Statute No. 2472/1997 entitled “Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data” 
has largely been replaced by the new Statute No. 4624/2019. 
• Statute No. 2225/1994 (as consecutively amended by virtue of Statute Nos. 3340/2005, 3606/2007, 
3658/2008, 4267/2014, 4411/2016, and 4481/2017) provides for the legal requirements to lift 
confidentiality for the purpose of national security or criminal justice. The said Statute has remained in 
force even after the enactment of the new Code of Criminal Procedure. 
• Statute No. 2068/1992, ratifying the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with 
regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (Convention No. 108). 
Case law 
(indicatively) 
Decision No. 31/2018 by the Pre-Trial Chamber of Heleia. 
Decision No. 16/2016 by the Court of Appeals Pre-Trial Chamber of Athens. 
Decision No. 27/2011 by the Pre-Trial Chamber of Katerini. 
Areios Pagos [Supreme Court for civil and criminal cases] Decision No. 924/2009. 
Opinion No. 19/2005 by the District Prosecutor of Thessaloniki. 
Opinion No. 14/2004 by the District Prosecutor of Thessaloniki. 
 
  








Fundamental Law of Hungary  
• According to Article VI, para 1, “[e]veryone shall have the right to respect for his or her private and family 
life, home, communications, and reputation […]”. 
• Article VI, para 3, recognises the persons’ right to protection of their personal data.  
• Article VI, para 4, stipulates that an independent authority created by means of a cardinal law is competent 
in supervising the protection of these personal data. 
Secondary 
sources 
•  Act C of 2012 on the Criminal Code 
o Article 224 (infringement of the confidentiality of correspondence) criminalises  
a) “[the] destruct[ion of] a sealed consignment containing communication which belongs to another 
person, or [the] open[ing] or [the] attain[ment] of such consignment for the purpose of gaining 
knowledge of the contents thereof, or [its] convey[ance] to unauthorised person for this purpose”, 
and 
b) “[the] capture […] [of] a correspondence forwarded by means of electronic communication 
networks, including information systems, to another person”. 
o Article 307 (unauthorised covert information-gathering or illegal use of covert means) provides that it is 
against the law  
a) “covertly [to] gather […] information without authorisation, for which the authorisation of a judge 
or the minister for justice is required, or [to] use […] any covert means for which a court order is 
required, or [to] exceed […] the scope of such authorisation”, and 
b) “unlawfully [to] order […] or [to] authorise […] covert information-gathering operation for which 
the authorisation of a judge or the minister for justice is required, and […] [to] use […] covert means 
for which a court order is required”. 
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• Act XC of 2017 on the Code of Criminal Procedure 
o Article 100: the defendant and the counsel for the defendant have the right of access to the documents 
of the procedure after the questioning of the defendant.  
o Article 205, para 1: electronic data can serve as evidence. 
o Article 214: general rules concerning the application of covert means for collecting data. 
o Article 215: forms of covert means neither subject to judicial approval nor to that of the public prosecutor 
(e.g. application of a secretly cooperating person; gathering information related to the crime without 
disclosing the real objective of the procedure).  
o Articles 216–230: forms of covert means subject to the approval of the public prosecutor (e.g. observation 
of financial transactions; observation with the approval of the person concerned; use of covert 
investigator). 
o Articles 231–232: forms of covert means subject to judicial approval (secret surveillance of an information 
system; secret research; secret observation of a place; secret knowledge of a consignment; interception). 
o Article 252, para 2: the outcome of covert data collection may be used for prosecuting another crime 
provided that the conditions of applying covert means are applicable to this latter crime, too. 
o Article 302, para 1: search may extend to information systems and data carriers. 
o Articles 308–323: detailed rules of seizure.  
a) Article 308: seizure has to ensure that the piece of evidence at issue is secured so that the criminal 
procedure can be conducted efficiently.  
b) Article 309: seizure can be ordered by the court, the prosecutor or the investigation authority. It is 
always the court that orders the seizure of the evidence kept in a notary’s office or law firm, and 
of that related to the activities of notaries or attorneys.  
c) Article 310: letters and other consignments between the defendant and the counsel for the 
defendant, and the notes of the counsel for the defendant pertaining to the case cannot be seized.  
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d) Articles 315–316: special rules related to the seizure and the preservation of electronic data. The 
obligation to preserve evidence limits the rights of the owner, the controller, and the processor 
over the electronic data.  
o Article 470: the suspect and the counsel for the defendant must have access to all pieces of evidence 
referred to in the motion for arrest. 
• Other relevant legislation  
• Act CXXV of 1995 on the National Security Services  
• Act LIV of 2002 on International Cooperation Between Law Enforcement Agencies  
• Act C of 2003 on Electronic Communications 
• Act CLXXX of 2012 on Cooperation in Criminal Matters between Member States of the European Union  
• Government Decree No. 180/2004. (V. 26.) on the Rules of Cooperation between Electronic 
Communications Service Providers and Authorities Authorised for Secret Data Collection 
• Government Decree No. 100/2018. (VI. 8.) on the Detailed Rules of the Investigation and the Preparatory 
Procedures 
Case law • Hungarian Constitutional Court, Decision No. 3271/2012. (X. 4.) AB 
• Hungarian National Authority for Data Protection and Freedom of Information, Opinion No. NAIH-1410-4/2014/J, 24 June 
2014 
• Hungarian Constitutional Court, Decision No. 3082/2015. (V. 8.) AB 
  








Constitution of Ireland 
• Article 40.3.1°, which requires the State to “guarantee in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by 
its laws to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen” 
• Article 40.3.2°, specifying that the State shall “in particular, by its laws protect as best it may from unjust 
attack and, in the case of injustice done, vindicate the life, person, good name and property rights of every 
citizen” 
• Article 40.5, which protects the inviolability of dwelling 
• Article 40.6.1°.i, mandating the State to guarantee “liberty for the exercise of” a number of rights “subject 




• Communications (Retention of Data) Act 2011 
o Section 1: “Serious offence” is defined in the 2011 Act as “an offence punishable by imprisonment for a 
term of 5 years or more”. The (criminal) offences referred to in Schedule 1 to the 2011 Act are deemed 
to be serious offences, notwithstanding the corresponding term of imprisonment for such offences. 
o Section 3: obliges service providers to retain data specified in Schedule 2 for one (internet data) or two 
years (for telephony data). 
o Section 3(3): Retention must be effectuated such that the retained data “may be disclosed without undue 
delay” upon request. 
o Section 4(1)(a)-(c): Service providers are required to ensure the quality and security of retained data. 
o Section 4(1)(d): Service providers are required to ensure the destruction of retained data within one 
month after the relevant retention period. 
o Section 4(2): the security of data retained under the 2011 Act by service providers is supervised by the 
Data Protection Commission. 
o Section 5: specifies the four situations in which retained data may be accessed, namely: 
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a) at the request and with consent of the data subject, 
b) in order to comply with a “disclosure request”, 
c) upon a court order, or 
d) as may be authorised by the Data Protection Commissioner. Within the context of (cross-border) 
access for criminal investigative and prosecutory purposes, the situations under (b) and (c) above 
are relevant. 
o Section 6(1): A disclosure request may not be made by a member of the Garda Síochána below the rank 
of chief superintendent. 
o Section 6(1)(a)-(c)A disclosure request may only be made for the purpose of (a) prevention, detection, 
investigation, or prosecution of serious (criminal) offences; (b) safeguarding of state security; or (c) the 
saving of human life. 
o Section 6(4) and (5): permits disclosure requests to be made orally “in cases of exceptional urgency”; oral 
disclosure requests must furthermore be confirmed in writing within two working day. 
o Section 10(2) and (3): Empowers the Complaints Referee84 to receive requests from data subjects to 
investigate whether a disclosure request pertaining to his/her data was in conformity with the provisions 
of section 6 of the 2011 Act. 
o Section 10(4) and (7): The Complaints Referee shall notify the data subject of its finding and, if it finds 
that LEAs acted in contravention of section 6 of the 2011 Act in the issuance of a disclosure request, 
report its conclusion to the Irish President. 
o Section 10(5): Upon concluding that section 6 had been contravened, the Complaints Referee is entitled 
to apply one or both of the following remedies as it sees fit: (a) issue a direction for the LEA to destroy 
the relevant data, and (b) recommend that compensation be paid to the data subject. 
o Section 10(8): The decision of the Complaints Referee is final. 
o Section 12: Designates judges who are tasked with monitoring the operation of the provisions of the 2011 
Act and ensuring that LEAs comply with its provisions. 
 
84 The Complaints Referee refers to the Complaints Referee established pursuant to section 9(2)(a) of the Interception of Postal Packets and Telecommunications Messages 
(Regulation) Act 1993. This Referee shall be nominated by the Irish President, and shall be a judge of the Circuit Court or the District Court or a practicing barrister or solicitor 
with at least 10 years’ standing (see Interception of Postal Packets and Telecommunications Messages (Regulation) Act 1993, section 9(2)(b)).  
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o Section 12(1)(c): the designated judge reports to the Irish President (Taoiseach), who in turn reports to 
the Irish Parliament. 
• Data Protection Act 2018 
o Section 60(1)(a) and (3)(a)(ii): contains a provision restricting data protection standards in the interest of 
criminal investigation and prosecution, even for what are considered ‘minor offences’.  
• Criminal Justice (Mutual Assistance) Act 2008 
o Section 73(1): A judge at a sitting of any (Irish) court to whom it appears that evidence, for the purpose 
of criminal proceedings have been instituted or a criminal investigation is taking place, may be obtained 
“at a place in a designated state”,85 may make a (letter of) request for assistance. In order for a judge to 
issue such “letters of request”, it must appear to him or her that criminal proceedings have been 
instituted or a criminal investigation is taking place, and that evidence for the purpose of such 
proceedings or investigation may be obtained at a place in a designated state. 
o Section 73(2): An application for such assistance may be made by the Director of Public Prosecutions 
(DPP) or by the individual charged (i.e. the accused) in criminal proceedings that have been instituted. 
o Section 73(3): The “letter of request”, issued by the Irish judge, shall be sent to the Minister for Justice 
and Equality (as the Irish Central Authority) for transmission to the authorities of the relevant designated 
state; the provision permits the Director of Public Prosecutions to issue and transmit an MLA request 
directly to the appropriate authorities of a designated state in exceptional (“urgent”) cases, the cross-
border request may also be sent directly to the relevant foreign authorities. 
o Section 73(5)(a)-(d): Requests issued by Irish authorities shall be issued in writing or by any means capable 
of producing a written record under conditions allowing the requested (Member) state to establish 
authenticity, and shall include the following: A statement that the evidence is required for the purpose 
of criminal proceedings or a criminal investigation; Information relating to the nature and location of the 
evidence concerned; A brief description of the conduct constituting the offence concerned;  and Any 
 
85 According to section 2 of the Criminal Justice (Mutual Assistance) Act 2008, a “designated state” includes all EU Member States, as well as any other States designated under 
section 4 of the Act.  
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other available information that may assist the appropriate authority in complying with the letter of 
request.  
o Section 73(6): Evidence obtained through a cross-border request in accordance with section 73 of the 
2008 Act may not be used for any other purpose than for which it was sought. 
o Section 75: The Minister for Justice and Equality, upon receipt of a mutual legal assistance request 
pursuant to the appropriate MLAT, will determine whether the MLA request is suitable for execution. The 
requirements for such a MLA request include: The request concerns assistance in obtaining specified 
evidential material or evidential material of a specified description;86 The evidence is sought for the 
purposes of criminal proceedings or a criminal investigation in the requesting State;87 There is power 
under any enactment to issue a warrant for the search of a place in respect of an offence constituted by 
the conduct giving rise to the request;88 The offence for which evidence is sought is punishable in both 
Ireland and the EU Member State (including Iceland, Norway and Switzerland)89 by imprisonment for a 
maximum period of at least 6 months,90 or punishable in both Ireland and a non-EU designated State;91 
or the offence is a criminal offence in Ireland and an administrative offence in the requesting Member 
State which could give rise proceedings before a court having, in particular, jurisdiction in criminal 
matters.92 The requesting authority must provide assurances that the evidence so provided would not be 
used for any purpose other than for which it was requested, and that such evidence will be returned 
when no longer required for said purpose;93 The request will be refused if, inter alia, in the Minister 
considers that providing assistance would be likely to prejudice the sovereignty, security or other 
essential interests of Ireland or be contrary to ordre public,94 there are reasonable grounds to believe 
that the request is of a discriminatory nature,95 providing assistance would lead to violation of a person’s 
 
86 Criminal Justice (Mutual Assistance) Act 2008, section 75(1). 
87 Criminal Justice (Mutual Assistance) Act 2008, section 75(1). 
88 Criminal Justice (Mutual Assistance) Act 2008, section 75(1). 
89 See Criminal Justice (Mutual Assistance) Act 2008, sections 75(19). 
90 Criminal Justice (Mutual Assistance) Act 2008, section 75(2)(a).  
91 Criminal Justice (Mutual Assistance) Act 2008, section 75(3). 
92 Criminal Justice (Mutual Assistance) Act 2008, section 75(2)(b). 
93 Criminal Justice (Mutual Assistance) Act 2008, section 75(6). 
94 Criminal Justice (Mutual Assistance) Act 2008, section 3(1)(a). 
95 Criminal Justice (Mutual Assistance) Act 2008, section 3(1)(b)(i). 
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rights under the ECHR (including prohibition of torture),96 or (and for as long as) providing assistance 
would prejudice a criminal investigation or criminal proceedings in Ireland.97 
o Section 75(5): If the Minister considers that a request for mutual legal assistance/cross-border request 
for access to electronic data meets the (abovementioned) conditions under the 2008 Act and relevant 
MLAT, the Minister shall direct the (Commissioner of the) Garda Síochána to obtain such evidence for 
transmission. 
o Section 75(8A): If the Garda Síochána is already in possession of the requested evidence, it is passed on 
by the Commissioner of the Garda to the requesting authority without delay. 
o Section 75(8): If the Garda Síochána is not in possession of the requested evidence a member of the 
Garda Síochána (not below the rank of inspector) shall apply to the judge of a relevant District Court for 
a production order. Evidence obtained by the Garda pursuant to a court order will be transmitted by the 
Commissioner of the Garda to the requesting authority without delay. 
o Section 75(14): A District Court judge may, at any sitting, vary or discharge a production order issued 
under section 75.  
• Criminal Evidence Act 1992 
o Section 1: defines “document” as including “a reproduction in permanent legible form, by a computer or 
other means (including enlarging) of information in non-legible form”. 
Case law • Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland, Judgment of 8 April 
2014, and Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15 Tele2 Sverige and Tom Watson, Judgment of 21 December 2016. 
• European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) Graham Dwyer v Commissioner of a Garda Síochána and others [2018] IEHC 685. 
• Irish Supreme Court in People (Attorney General) v O’Brien People (Attorney General) v O’Brien [1965] IR 142. 
• Irish Supreme Court in DPP v JC Director of Public Prosecutions v JC [2015] IESC 31. 
 
96 Criminal Justice (Mutual Assistance) Act 2008, section 3(1)(b)(ii)(II). 
97 Criminal Justice (Mutual Assistance) Act 2008, section 3(1)(d). 









• Articles 14 and 15 of the Italian Constitution come into play with reference to privacy concerns in relation 




o Article 491 bis defines the “electronic document” as “electronic support containing data or information 
having value as evidence”. It thus clearly still conceives evidence as something material. 
o Article 1(1)(p) Legislative Decree 82/2005 (Codice dell’Amministrazione Digitale) updated such definition, 
focusing on the digital “representation” of acts, facts and data legally relevant (Art. 491 bis CC) 
o Law 48/2008 equally acknowledges a distinction between electronic evidence and their digital support. 
Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) 
• Articles 723-729 regulate traditional mutual legal assistance tools  
o Article 723–726 ter CCP explicitly covers cases in which national authorities are requested to collect 
or transfer evidence to another country 
o Article 727–729 CCP covers cases in which national authorities requested another country to 
collect or transfer evidence.  
• Law 48/2008 (implementing the Cybercrime Convention) amended the Code of Criminal Procedure 
introducing provisions on the use of new technologies:  
o Article 254 bis CCP, dealing with the acquisition of data from ICT providers. 
o Article 615 quinquies, 635 bis CC; Article 244(2), 247(1)(bis), 254, 352(1)(bis), 354(2) of the Italian CCP 
have been amended to regulate cases in which electronic evidence are involved.  
o Article 247(1)(bis) provides for “the gathering of data, information, computer programs or any trace of 
an offence” that “one may find in a computer system”. 
o Article 723 CCP: the Ministry of Justice has to exercise a political scrutiny of all requests coming from a 
foreign country with reference to state sovereignty, security and the fundamental interests of the state, 
respect of the law and public order, safeguard of the defendant against any discrimination, etc. 
o Article 724 CCP: The file then proceeds to the judicial authority, scrutinising the admissibility of the 
request and its execution. The public prosecutor receives documents from the Ministry and sends its 
requests to the Court of Appeal where the investigation must take place  
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• Legislative Decree 52/2017 implemented the Convention on mutual assistance in criminal matters 
between EU Member States: crucial role to judicial authorities, whereas the Ministry of Justice only 
intervenes in specific cases. By virtue of Art. 8, the competent authority to receive and handle requests 
is the public prosecutor of the district court where acts have to be executed. In order to simplify the 
procedure, there is no involvement of the Court of Appeal, that intervenes instead for mutual assistance 
cases (Art. 724 CCP)  
o Article 8(2): the Judge for Preliminary Investigations is instead competent for receiving and handling 
requests when foreign authorities require the involvement of an independent judicial authority (“sitting 
judge”) or because the domestic legal order so requires (e.g. in the case of interception of 
communications). 
o (Art. 8(4) and (5)): the execution of the requests must comply with formalities indicated by the foreign 
authority to safeguard the possibility to use the information requested at trial.  
o Article 19 relates to the need for Italy to help in interceptions taking place in the requesting State or a 
Third State, which is still party of the Convention.  
o Should the interception take place in Italy, the prosecutor must obtain the authorisation of the Judge for 
the Preliminary Investigations (Art. 20). The interception must refer to an offence which would allow 
interceptions under Italian law.  
o Should there be urgent matters, the public prosecutor can proceed autonomously and ask for validation 
from the Judge for Preliminary Investigations within 48 hours (Art. 20(1) which corresponds to Art. 267(2) 
CCP). 
o Article 22 then provides for cases where interceptions are ordered for by the Italian authority, which 
require the assistance of a foreign authority. In such cases the request is sent by the public prosecutor. 
Should the interception take place abroad, the Italian authority must send a copy of the interception 
warrant to the foreign authority, which can stop the interceptions at any time.  
• Legislative Decree 108/2017 puts into effect Directive 2014/41/UE on the European Investigation Order. 
Legislative Decree 52/2017 continues to be applicable at least for Member States not bound by the 
2014 EIO Directive, and countries which do not belong to the EU but have signed the 2000 Brussels 
Convention, such as Norway and Iceland. 
o Articles 43 and 44 identify the public prosecutor as the competent authority to send an EIO requests, 
bypassing the fact that Art. 267 CCP requires the authorisation of the Judge for the Preliminary 
Investigations (GIP) for interceptions to take place in Italy.  
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o Art. 9(1) and (3) highlights that the EIO request must be refused should there be no prerequisites 
requested by Italian law.   
o In order to guarantee a coordination, if the investigation concerns organised crime or terrorism offences 
(Art. 51(3)(bis) e (quater) CCP), the Antimafia National Directorate must be informed. 
o Article 5 of the Legislative Decree specifies cases when the judge must be involved, because of a request 
of the foreign authority or because the Italian legislation provides so (e.g. for the compulsory collection 
of biological samples ex Art. 359 bis CCP).  
• By virtue of Art. 7 of the legislative decree, the executing authority in Italy can operate a proportionality 
test. The Italian authority could also decide to choose a less invasive investigative tool in the name of 
proportionality, thus better safeguarding individual rights, while preserving the efficiency of international 
cooperation. Such choice becomes mandatory should the act required not exist under Italian law or should 
Italian law not provide the use of such investigative tool with reference to the offence under investigation 
(Art. 10 legislative decree). 
• Article 189 CCP: If evidence not regulated by law is requested, the judge may introduce it if it is deemed 
suitable to determine the facts and does not compromise the moral freedom of the person. After hearing 
the parties on the methods for gathering evidence, the judge shall order the admission of evidence. 
• Law 48/2008 provides for the main objectives for law enforcement authorities, in line with international 
best practices.  
Case law • Cass., I, 18 ottobre 2001 in MLA cases, even when the request has been sent directly to a public prosecutor by a foreign 
authority (because the mutual legal agreement in question provides so), the Court of Appeal is still competent for the 
execution of the request. 
• Cass pen, sez. V, sentenza 16/01/2018 n° 1822 on the use at trial of WhatApp messages and SMS stored in a seized cell 
phone. 
• Cass. Sez. Unite, Sentenza no. 15208 of 25 February 2010. The Corte di Cassazione decided that evidence gathered abroad 
are inadmissible only if gathered in contrast with provision of public order or good morals, which are not necessarily 
identifiable simply with defence rights.  
• Cass. Sez. 6, Sentenza no. 44488 of 1 December 2010 and Cass. Sez. 6, Sentenza no. 43534 of 24 April 2012. Evidence cannot 
be gathered in contrast with the fundamental principles of the Italian legal system, including defence rights. 
• Cass. Sez. II, Sentenza no. 44673 of 12 November 2008. Documents spontaneously produced by foreign judicial authorities 
and sent to the Italian authorities have been considered admissible as evidence at trial. 
  









• Art. 28: Secrecy of all communications; the law shall determine which responsible agents may violate this 
principle with regard to letters, and shall determine the protection to be given to the secrecy of telegrams. 
Secondary 
sources 
• Luxembourg Criminal Code 
o Art. 458 enshrines as a criminal offence punishable by imprisonment of 8 days to 6 months and a fine 
of 500 to 5000 EUR any doctor, surgeon, health officer, pharmacist, midwife or any other person 
holding, by state or by profession, secrets confided to them, except when called upon by justice to 
reveal them. This provision expressly applies to telecommunications operators / service providers when 
called upon to cooperate in criminal justice context by virtue of Art. 48-27 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure (cited below). 
• Luxembourg Code of Criminal Procedure 
o Art. 7-2 establishes that “any offence of which an act characterising one of its constitutive elements 
has been committed in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg shall be considered to have been committed 
on the territory of the Grand Duchy”. 
o Arts 5 – 7-4: several provisions providing for extraterritorial jurisdiction where offence is committed 
abroad but the perpetrator is either a Luxembourg national or resident or a foreign citizen present on 
Luxembourg territory. 
o Art. 24-1: with respect to all misdemeanours (délits), the public prosecutor may request that the 
investigating judge order a search of private premises, the hearing of a witness or an “expertise” 
without opening a judicial inquiry (instruction préparatoire).” However, beyond misdemeanours, the 
public prosecutor’s power to do so is limited to certain infractions (use of forged documents; theft with 
aggravating circumstances or with violence). Furthermore, since 2014, and in this case only for those 
infractions just stated and misdemeanours carrying a correctional penalty of at least one year, the 
public prosecutor may also take the mini-instruction route to have an investigating judge order the 
“tracking and localisation” of telecommunications (Arts. 24-1(1) & 67-1). 
o Art. 33(1): public prosecutor may order that a search be carried out – at any time of day or night – of 
the residence of persons who appear to have participated in the commission of a criminal offence or 
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(widening the scope of the provision) to possess pièces, données ou objets relating to the criminal acts 
in question.  
o Art. 48-25: rapid preservation of data; introduced in 2014 implementing Budapest Convention. 
o Art. 48-27: mandatory provision of subscriber data by telecommunications operators/service providers 
on pain of sanction (inter alia fine of 1,250 to 125,000 EUR) when requested by investigating judge, 
public prosecutor or (in urgent cases) the judicial police – who must provide reasoned, written decision 
within 24 hours to state prosecutor or investigating judge.  Art. 458 Criminal Code also applies (see 
above). 
o Art. 49: in Luxembourgish law, unless otherwise stated a judicial inquiry is mandatory for crimes; it is 
optional for misdemeanours (délits). 
o Art. 51: The investigating judge may perform, in conformity with the law, any acte d’information which 
s/he deems to be useful to discovering the truth. S/he gathers and verifies, with equal care, the facts 
and circumstances tending to inculpate or exculpate (à charge ou à décharge) the inculpé. 
o Art. 65: Searches may be carried out in any place where objects may be found which could be useful 
for the discovery of the truth.  
o Art. 66(1): The investigating judge’s powers of seizure cover any object, document, effects, data stored, 
processed or transmitted in an automated data processing or transmission system…. 
o …. as well as, via Art. 31(3): effects which have been used to commit a crime or which were destined to 
be used as such and those which have formed the object of the crime, as well as everything which 
appears to have been the product of the crime, as well as in general, all that appears useful to the 
discovery of the truth or the use of which would be of such as nature as to harm the good workings of 
the instruction and all that is liable to confiscation or restitution. 
o Art. 66(3): Seizure of data can be done either by taking possession of the device (“support physique”) 
or by making a copy of the data made in the presence of the persons attending the search. If a copy is 
made, the investigating judge may order the definitive erasure of the data on the device, where the 
device is located in Luxembourg and is not “in the hands of justice”, where possession or use of the 
data is illegal or dangerous for the security of persons or goods. 
o Art. 126: possibilities to challenge before chambre du conseil a request for grande entraide issued by 
investigating judge.  
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o Art. 48-2: possibilities to challenge before chambre du conseil a request for petite entraide emanating 
from public prosecutor. 
Other relevant legislation 
• Loi du 8 août 2000 sur l'entraide judiciaire internationale en matière pénale, as amended. 
• Loi du 30 mai 2005 relative aux dispositions spécifiques de protection de la personne à l’égard du traitement 
des données à caractère personnel dans le secteur des communications électroniques. 
• Loi du 27 février 2011 sur les réseaux et les services de communications électroniques. 
• Loi du 18 juillet 2014 portant 1) approbation de la Convention du Conseil de l’Europe sur la 
cybercriminalité ouverte à la signature à Budapest le 23 novembre 2001, 2) approbation du Protocole 
additionnel à la Convention sur la cybercriminalité, relatif à l'incrimination d'actes de nature raciste et 
xénophobe commis par le biais de systèmes informatiques, fait à Strasbourg le 28 janvier 2003, 
3) modification du Code pénal, 
4) modification du Code d'instruction criminelle, 
5) modification de la loi modifiée du 30 mai 2005 concernant la protection de la vie privée dans le secteur 
des communications électroniques. 
• Loi du 27 juin 2018 adaptant la procédure pénale aux besoins liés à la menace terroriste et portant 
modification 
1) du Code de procédure pénale, 
2) de la loi modifiée du 30 mai 2005 concernant la protection de la vie privée dans le secteur des 
communications électroniques, 
3) de la loi du 27 février 2011 sur les réseaux et les services de communications électroniques. 
• Loi du 1er août 2018 portant 
1° transposition de la directive 2014/41/UE du Parlement européen et du Conseil du 3 avril 2014 
concernant la décision d'enquête européenne en matière pénale ; 
2° modification du Code de procédure pénale ; 
3° modification de la loi modifiée du 8 août 2000 sur l’entraide judiciaire internationale en matière 
pénale. 
Case law Judgment of the Cour d’appel, 11th March 2008 
Judgment of the Cour de cassation du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, N° 14/2014 pénal, 13th March 2014 








Dutch Constitution  
• Art. 10: right to privacy. 
• Art. 11: right to inviolability of his person. 
• Art. 12: right to the inviolability of one’s home; prior identification and notice of purpose shall be required to 
enter a home; a written report of the entry shall be issued to the occupant as soon as possible. If the entry 
was made in the interests of state security or criminal proceedings, the issue of the report may be postponed 
under rules to be laid down by Act of Parliament. A report need not be issued in cases, to be determined by 
Act of Parliament, where such issue would never be in the interests of state security. 
• Art. 13: The privacy of correspondence shall not be violated except in the cases laid down by Act of Parliament, 
by order of the courts. The privacy of the telephone and telegraph shall not be violated except, in the cases 
laid down by Act of Parliament, by or with the authorisation of those designated for the purpose by Act of 
Parliament. 
• Art. 93 and 94: the Netherlands is a monist country; provisions of treaties and of resolutions by international 
institutions which may be binding on all persons by virtue of their contents shall become binding after they 
have been published. 
Secondary 
sources 
• Code of Criminal Procedure (Wetboek van Strafordering) 
o Art. 5.4., Book 5: provisions on the European Investigative Order (EIO). 
o Art. 125n: a public prosecutor may request from a communication service to identify and provide traffic 
data for specific users. If the request concerns a person who can claim protection as a source, the public 
prosecutor requires authorisation by an investigative judge. 
o Art. 126na: investigating officers may request user/subscriber data from a communication service. 
Written report is required. 
o Art. 126nb: seizing of communications equipment by order of a public prosecutor for a maximum of 
one week. Written report is required.  
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o Art. 126nba: bugging/infiltration of a technical device of system ordered by the public prosecutor and 
authorised by an investigative judge for serious crimes and more intrusive measures for serious crimes 
that carry a prison sentence of 8 years or more. Written report is required. 
o Art. 126nc: investigative officers may request identifying data in relation to a crime person who is 
reasonably eligible for it and who processes data other than for personal use, provide certain stored or 
recorded identifying data of a person. Identifying data is: a) name, address, place of residence and 
postal address; b) date of birth and gender; c) administrative characteristics; d) in the case of a legal 
person, instead of the information referred to under a) and b): name, address, postal address, legal 
form and location. The request cannot relate to personal data regarding a person’s religion or belief, 
race, political affiliation, health, sexual life or membership of a trade union. A written report must be 
drawn up.  
o Art. 126nd: a public prosecutor may request data in relation to a serious crime from those who can 
reasonably be suspected of having access to certain stored or recorded data, demand this data. The 
public prosecutor’s request is conditional upon authorisation by an investigative judge where the data 
concerned relates to personal data concerning a person’s religion or belief, race, political affiliation, 
health, sexual life or membership of a trade union (sensitive data). In any case, the public prosecutor 
must draw up a written report. 
o Art. 126nf: the investigative officer may request data in relation to a serious crime from a person who 
can reasonably be suspected of having access to images made with cameras for the protection of goods, 
buildings or persons. Such requests cannot be addressed to the suspect. In case the data includes 
sensitive personal data, i.e. data relating to a person’s religion or belief, race, political affiliation, health, 
sexual life or membership of a trade union, such a request can only be made by a public prosecutor and 
is conditional upon authorisation of an investigative judge. 
o Art. 126ng: fall back measure for public prosecutors to request other data from communication service 
providers than those covered by Articles 126n and 126na. 
o Art. 126nh: a public prosecutor may request the encryption of data by a person who can reasonably be 
believed that he has knowledge of the method of encrypting the data referred to in these articles, 
orders that he will cooperate in decrypting the data by reversing the encryption, or making this 
knowledge available. This order cannot be given to a suspect, only to a third party. 
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o Art. 126ni: a public prosecutor can request the freezing of data for a maximum period of 90 days (with 
the possible of extending it once) for data held by those who can reasonably be suspected of having 
access to certain data stored in an automated system at the time of the request and data which can 
reasonably be assumed to be particularly susceptible to loss or alteration. In case this request is aimed 
at communications service providers, the provider is obliged to provide as soon as possible the 
information required to identify the other providers whose services have been used in the 
communication. A written report must be drawn up.  
o Art. 339: the judge admits evidence based on the principle of ‘intimate conviction’ and provided that it 
was collected using legal means. In addition, only certain forms of evidence are admitted (i.e. may be 
cited as proof in the judgement), which includes: own conviction or opinion of the judge; declarations 
of the suspect; declarations of a witness; declarations of an expert; and ‘written documents’. 
o Art. 344: Evidence obtained from abroad, including the e-data files, protocols and transcripts issued by 
foreign authorities, are considered a ‘written document’. Such documents, as long as they originate 
from/are certified by the competent (foreign) authorities and are composed in accordance with the 
legally prescribed format, are directly admissible in the Dutch proceedings. 
Other relevant legislation 
• Wet Bijzondere Opsporingsbevoegdheden, Wet BOB 
• Telecommunicatie Wet 
• Wet tot wijziging van het Wetboek van Strafvordering en enkele andere wetten met het oog op het 
moderniseren van de regeling van internationale samenwerking in strafzaken (Herziening regeling 
internationale samenwerking in strafzaken) 
• Wet tot wijziging van het Wetboek van Strafvordering ter implementatie van de Richtlijn 2014/41/EU van 
het Europees Parlement en de Raad van 3 april 2014 betreffende het Europees onderzoeksbevel in 
strafzaken (implementatie Richtlijn Europees onderzoeksbevel) 
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• Aanwijzing Opsporingsbevoegdheden 
• Besluit tot vaststelling van het tijdstip van inwerkingtreding van de Wet van 31 mei 2017 tot wijziging van 
het Wetboek van Strafvordering ter implementatie van de Richtlijn 2014/41/EU van het Europees 
Parlement en de Raad van 3 april 2014 betreffende het Europees onderzoeksbevel in strafzaken 
(implementatie Richtlijn Europees onderzoeksbevel) 
Case law Dutch Supreme Court HR, 25 February 2003, NJ 2003, n. 571 
Dutch Supreme Court HR 14 September 1987, NJ 1988. N. 301 
  









• Article 18, Section: protects the rights to privacy, including in the context of criminal investigations. 
• Art. 18, Section 3: strictly requires prior judicial authorisation for acts or decisions interfering with the right 
to secrecy of communications. 
Secondary 
sources 
• Criminal Code 
o Article 33.2. of the Criminal Code: classifies criminal penalties based on their nature and duration. 
Penalties are classified as serious, less serious and light. Serious penalties are those corresponding to a 
term of imprisonment of more than five years. 
• Spanish Code of Criminal Procedure  
o Article 579.1: introduces two criteria for determining the degree of seriousness that an offence must 
present in order to justify the retention, access and communication of personal data for law enforcement 
and criminal justice purposes. The first is a substantive criterion relating to serious criminal offences, 
including, in particular, offences committed in the context of a criminal organisation and terrorism 
offences. The second is a formal normative criterion, which sets a lower threshold of three years’ 
imprisonment. 
o Article 588 bis (a): sets out general ‘guiding principles’ - and in particular the principles of speciality, 
suitability, exceptionality, necessity and proportionality – that must be complied with by the authorities 
issuing and/or implementing measures of technological inquiry. 
o Article 588 bis (b) para 2: requests for data made by police or prosecutors must often undergo prior 
scrutiny by a competent judicial authority. Their request for judicial validation shall contain the 
description of the facts, the object of the inquiry, indicate the identity of the person under investigation 
or of any other person affected by the measure (provided that such data are known), justify the necessity 
and utility of the requested data for the purpose of investigating the crime at hand, and specify scope 
and implementation modalities of the investigative measures for which authorisation is sought. 
o Article 588 bis (c): Upon reception of a police or prosecutor’s request, the investigating judge – having 
heard the prosecutor – has 24 hours to decide whether to authorise or refuse its execution. 
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o Article 588 bis (g): The judicial police is under the obligation to report the results of the data-gathering 
measure to the investigating judge, and also the way in which it was carried out. 
o Article 588 ter (a): circumscribes the interception of electronic (and telephone) communication involving 
the investigated individual (either as transmitter or receiver) to serious offences, or offences committed 
through software tools or any other information or communication technology or communication service 
(cybercrime). 
o Article 588 ter (b), para 1 and 2: requires prior authorisation by a court for interception of electronic (and 
telephone) communication involving the investigated individual (either as transmitter or receiver) when 
the investigative measure entails access to the content of such information. The same requirement 
applies to the interception of traffic data, and data associated with the communication process or 
generated regardless of the establishment of a specific communication between the suspect and third 
parties. Special rules apply when the interception request affects third parties. 
o Article 588 ter (d) specific (additional) information must be included in police requests for judicial 
authorisation when the latter are directed at obtaining an authorisation for the interception of electronic 
communication. 
o Article 588 ter (e): imposes a duty to cooperate upon “all the providers of telecommunications services, 
of access to a telecommunications or services network of the information society, as well as any person 
that contributes in any way to facilitate the communications”. 
o Article 588 ter (j): A prior judicial validation must be obtained when investigative measures are directed 
at obtaining data contained in the automated files of service providers. Such an authorisation must be 
obtained ex ante for measures targeting retained data, and data related to the communication process. 
o Article 588 ter (k): Requires judicial validation by the investigating judge for requests concerning 
information sought in relation to the ownership of a phone number or of any other communication, or 
the telephone number or the identifying data associated with the means of communication. Judicial 
validation is required when such information is not recorded, and the police and prosecutor need it for 
the identification and location of the terminal, connection device, or, for the identification of the suspect 
behind an IP address used to commit a crime, a request for access must be authorised. 
o Article 588 ter (l): IMEI and ISMI codes can also be tracked by the police without any judicial intervention. 
In case of emergency, the judicial police or the prosecutor may also search storage devices without 
judicial authorisation. 
JUD-IT HANDBOOK | 73 
 
o Article 588 ter (m): Subscriber data and, more generally, the data allowing the identification of the owner 
of a communication means (e.g. subscriber information, email addresses) can be requested by the public 
prosecutor or the judicial police directly from the service providers. 
o Article 588 sexies (a): When seeking access to electronic data repositories seized during traditional (i.e. 
house/physical) searches, the police or prosecutors must present an ‘individual justification’ specifying 
the grounds legitimating the access to the information contained in these devices to the investigating 
judge responsible for validating the request. 
o Article 588 sexies (c), para 3: In cases of emergency, the judicial police or the prosecutor may search 
storage devices without judicial authorisation. They must, however, immediately inform the magistrate 
about these emergency searches, the way in which they were conducted, and the results obtained. The 
competent magistrate may then confirm or revoke the measure. 
o Article 588 Octies: Preservation can be ordered for a maximum period of ninety days, which may be 
extended once, until the transfer is authorised. 
o Article 773 para 2: Opening of a criminal case. The trial preparation requires prior investigation and 
records of the commission of the offence and the circumstances including its perpetrator. The police 
investigation will be conducted in a preliminary stage, aimed at providing relevant and sufficient 
information to enable the public prosecutor to launch a formal prosecution. The latter is only opened 
when the investigating judge considers that there is sufficient evidence to open a formal investigative 
stage and/or pre-trial investigation. Under Spanish law, the investigative stage and/or pre-trial 
investigation is still conducted by a judge, generally the investigating judge. 
 
Other relevant legislation  
• Ley 25/2007 on the retention of data relating to electronic communications and to public communication 
networks) of 18 October 2007 
o Article 3: Extends the prior judicial validation requirement to requests concerning different categories of 
retained data, including most notably traffic data, location data, as well as data necessary to identify 
subscribers or registered users 
o Article 5 para 2: Introduces an obligation for private companies to communicate retained data to 
authorised Spanish law enforcement authorities. 
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• Ley Orgánica 13/2015 reforming the Code of Criminal Procedure for the strengthening of procedural 
guarantees and the regulation of he means of technological investigations.   
• Ley 23/2014, of 20 November on mutual recognition of criminal justice decisions within the EU. 
• Ley 3/2018, of 11 June, modifying Ley 23/2014, of 20 November on mutual recognition of criminal justice 
decisions within the EU for regulating the European Investigation Order. 
• Ley 59/2003. 
 
Case law Constitutional Court 
STC 62/1982 (Doctrine reiterated in: SSTC 181/1995; 49/1996; 54/1996; 123/1997; 49/1999; 166/1999; 171/1999; 236/1999; 
126/2000; 14/2001; 202/2001; 82/2002; 167/2002; 184/2003; 205/2005; 259/2005; 104/2006; 239/2006) 
STC 70/2002 
STC 123/2002  
STC 26/2006 
STC 173/2011 
Supreme Court  
SSTS, 24 February 2015 
SSTS no 16/2014 
SSTS, 17 April 2013 
SSTS, 20 May and 18 November 2008, and of 28 January 2009 
STS Decision no. 737/2009 
SSTS, 9 and 28 of May 2008 
SSTC n. 161/1990 
SSTC n. 150/1987 
 
  








Swedish Constitution  
• The constitutional provisions on fundamental rights and freedoms contained in the Freedom of the Press 
Act (tryckfrihetsförordningen, TF) and the Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression 
(yttrandefrihetsgrundlagen, YGL) are exclusive. Among other things, this means that it is exhaustively stated 
what opinions in the constitutionally protected media are allowed and who is responsible, under criminal 
liability, for possible violations.98 Only the Chancellor of Justice may initiate a preliminary investigation for 
crimes as referred to in the Freedom of the Press Act and the Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression. 
Only the Chancellor of Justice may decide on coercive measures for such crimes and there are special 
procedural provisions in these cases. If a question arises about the execution of an investigation order based 
on an offence covered by the Freedom of the Press Act and the Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression, 
consultations shall be held with the Chancellor of Justice. 
• In principle, the Directive and the implementing legislation cover all types of evidence gathering, including 
interrogation, seizure, body inspection, temporary transfer of detainees and secret coercive measures. 
These measures constitute such restrictions on the fundamental rights and freedoms that according to 
Chapter 2 of the Swedish Instrument of Government, 99 can only be regulated by law. 
• According to Chapter 10, Section 13 of the Instrument of Government, Swedish Prosecutors are obliged to 
notify the Head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when matters that are relevant to the relationship with 
another state arise. This may be applicable in cases where another state issues an EIO received by Sweden, 
as well as when Sweden issues an investigation order to another member state. The Legal Department shall 
be informed in these situations, and notifies the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Secondary 
sources 
• In general, the most relevant rules regulating what measures the Law Enforcement Authorities can take 
while investigating crimes can be found in Chapter 23 (Preliminary Investigation), Chapter 27 (Seizure, 
 
98 See Prop. 2016/17: 218 p. 139, and the Swedish Prosecution Authority’s Handbook on the European Investigation Order, December 2017, at p. 66. 
99 Regeringsformen (1974:152). 
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Secret Wire-tapping, etc.) and Chapter 28 (Search of Premises, Body Search and Body Examination) of the 
Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure.100 
• Some basic principles govern how a Swedish preliminary investigation should be conducted. Chapter 23, 
Section 4 of the Code of Judicial Procedure stipulates that a preliminary investigation shall be conducted 
objectively. In addition, it is stated that it should be conducted so that no person is unnecessarily exposed 
to suspicion, or put to unnecessary cost or inconvenience, the so-called principle of consideration 
(hänsynsprincipen). Four general principles apply primarily to the use of coercive measures against 
individuals: the principles of legality, purpose, need and proportionality (legalitets- ändamåls-, behovs- och 
proportionalitetsprinciperna). These principles guide the prosecutor's assessment of which measures 
should be subject to a Swedish investigation order.101  
• What may be considered necessary and proportionate is assessed in the individual case. In addition to the 
proportionality test under national law, issuing an investigation order shall be weighed against another 
member state's provision of staff and other resources to assist a Swedish prosecutor or court.102 The 
offences to which the investigation order refers should be taken into account in this assessment, even if the 
penalty thresholds for the execution of the measure under Swedish law are met.103 An executive authority 
may, if there is reason to assume that any of the conditions are not met, consult the issuing authority on 
the importance of executing the investigation order (Article 6(3) EIO Directive). After consultation, the 
issuing authority may withdraw the investigation order. 
• The rules of the Code of Judicial Procedure for information to the person entitled to appeal a final decision 
is applicable to the District Court's decision (Chapter 30, Section 10, second paragraph and Section 11). The 
possibility of appeal is open even when a decision on an action has been taken in connection with a foreign 
investigation order. 
• According to Chapter 23, Section 18, first paragraph of the Code of Judicial Procedure, the suspect and his 
or her defence counsel have the right to state the inquiry they consider desirable and otherwise state 
whatever they deem necessary. At the request of the suspect or his or her counsel, in accordance with the 
 
100 Rättegångsbalken (1942:740). 
101 Prop. 2016/17: 218 p. 93, and the Swedish Prosecution Authority’s Handbook on the European Investigation Order, December 2017, at p. 20. 
102 See Prop. 2016/17: 218 p. 94f, and the Swedish Prosecution Authority’s Handbook on the European Investigation Order, December 2017, at p. 20. 
103 Prop. 2016/17: 218 p. 94, and the Swedish Prosecution Authority’s Handbook on the European Investigation Order, December 2017, at p. 20. 
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second paragraph, interrogation or other investigation shall take place, if this may be considered to be of 
importance to the investigation. If such a request is refused, the reasons for this shall be stated.  
• Chapter 23, Section 19 of the Code of Judicial Procedure states that, if investigators do not approve such a 
request for investigation, the person concerned may report this to the court, who shall examine the 
notification as soon as possible.  
• Based on Chapter 45, Section 10 of the Code of Judicial Procedure the accused may also invoke evidence 
meaning that the court needs to issue an investigation order. No special provision has been introduced that 
an investigation order may be issued at the request of a suspect, accused or his or her defence counsel. 
• The decisions of the Court in these matters are decisions in the trial (see Chapter 30, Section 1, Code of 
Judicial Procedure) and may not be appealed separately, cf. Chapter 49, Section 3, unless there is a question 
under Chapter 49, Section 5 of the Code of Judicial Procedure (see especially point 6).  
• Chapter 4, Section 1 of the EIO Act states that there are only a few actions in an investigation order that 
may be appealed. A prosecutor should therefore, in connection with the notification pursuant to Chapter 
23, Section 19 Code of Judicial Procedure expresses his or her views on the conditions for issuing an 
investigation order. 
• In Sweden witnesses are only interviewed under oath before courts of law during a trial (unless they are 
exempted because of a close relationship with any party). During a preliminary investigation, when 
witnesses are questioned by the police, they are informed about the importance of speaking the truth, but 
are not required to take an oath and it is therefore not illegal to lie. In Sweden, almost any evidence is 
allowed before the courts, and it is for the court to evaluate the evidence. Swedish prosecutors try to adapt 
to foreign formalities, but sometimes it is not possible since it challenges fundamental principles in Swedish 
law. 
• The investigation order for the taking of evidence shall be conducted in accordance with the law of the 
executing country. This means that consideration should be given to, as a special procedure, the request 
that defendants and plaintiffs not be heard under oath or equivalent assurance, as this would contravene 
basic legal principles in Swedish law.  
• If there is reason to assume that a witness to be heard at the foreign court is related to a party, the court 
should also state that the witness must be informed that he or she is not required to file a testimony 
(Chapter 36, Provisions 3 and 10 Code of Judicial Procedure).  
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• The court should ask that the relatives of the defendant do not take an oath as there is a ban on this in 
Chapter 36, Section 13 of the Code of Judicial Procedure.  
• Provisions concerning the conditions for issuing an investigation order can be found in Chapter 1, section 
4, point 6 and Chapter 2, sections 1, 3 of the EIO Act.  
• According to Chapter 2, Section 5 of the EIO Act, before issuing an investigation order, the prosecutor needs 
to apply for the court’s examination of the prerequisites regarding secret camera surveillance and secret 
interception.  
• However, according to Chapter 2, Section 5, second paragraph of the EIO Act, pending a court trial, the 
prosecutor may issue an investigation order for secret camera surveillance under the conditions set out in 
Chapter 27, Section 21 of the Code of Judicial Procedure. (The provision does not apply to secret 
interception.) The prosecutor shall report to the court that such an investigation order has been issued 
without delay. 
 
Other relevant legislation  
• International Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act (2000:562) (LIRB Act).104  
• Chapter 2, Section 11 of the LIRB Act. 
• Act on Joint Investigation Teams for Criminal Investigations (2003:1174).105 
• Act (2017:1000) on a European Investigation Order (EIO Act).106 
• Chapter 3, Section 15 of the EIO Act: A request for a particular procedure to apply when a requested 
measure in an investigation order is executed must be met, unless such formalities and procedure are 
contrary to the fundamental principles of the Swedish legal order (cf. Article 9(2) of the EIO Directive). 
 
104 Lagen (2000:562) om internationell rättslig hjälp i brottmål (LIRB) (Government Bill 1999/2000:61; Government Bill 2004/05:144). See also The International Legal Assistance 
in Criminal Matters Ordinance (2000:704). The agreements that the International Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act (2000:562) refers to are listed in the Notification 
(2005:1207) concerning agreements referred to in the International Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act (2000:562). 
105 Lag (2003:1174) om vissa former för internationellt samarbete i brottsutredningar) (Government Bill 2003/04:4; Government Bill 2004/05:144); The Ordinance on Joint 
Investigation Teams for Criminal Investigations (2003:1174). Framework decision of 13 June 2002 on joint investigation teams (2002/465/RIF). 
106 Lag (2017:1000) om en europeisk utredningsorder. 
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• EIO Ordinance (2017:1019):107 Article 16(2)(c) of the EIO Directive provides for an obligation for the 
executing authority to inform the issuing authority if it has been decided in individual cases that the specific 
formalities and procedures requested cannot be complied with. The notification obligation has been 
introduced in Chapter 3, Section 8, point 3 of the Ordinance. In Chapter 2, Section 11 of the LIRB Act there 
is a corresponding provision with similar wording as regards legal assistance in criminal matters. 
• There are a number of international legal instruments that enable cooperation, such as legal assistance, 
EIO (since December 1, 2017), Nordic and European arrest warrant and extradition. 
• The International Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act (LIRB Act) mainly consists of cooperation 
between prosecutors and courts. International police and customs collaboration is regulated by other laws. 
The LIRB Act does not cover extradition, surrender or the service of documents for which special legislation 
exists. Cooperation with international tribunals and the International Criminal Court is also regulated by 
other laws. Likewise, investigation measures during the police investigation and investigation work are not 
covered by the EIO. Neither acts in the area of enforcement of judgments fall within its scope. 
• The EIO Act,108 and a new EIO Ordinance,109 entered into force on 1 December 2017.110 At the same time, 
amendments were made to the LIRB Act and other acts,111 along with certain consequential amendments 
to ordinances. The EIO Act and the EIO Ordinance replace the corresponding provisions of the LIRB Act, Act 
(2005:500) on the recognition and enforcement of the Freezing Decree, and Act (2003:1174) on certain 
forms of international cooperation in criminal investigations. 
• It is the issuing prosecutor or court that will send the investigation order to the competent authority 
(Chapter 2, Section 7 of the EIO Act). 
• The EU-convention from 2000 on mutual legal assistance (MLA) in criminal matters direct communication 
is assumed, as a main rule. 
• Chapter 1 Section 7 of the LIRB Act states that a Swedish prosecutor may apply for legal assistance abroad 
to the extent permitted by the other state. As long as the requested state allows, prosecutors may apply 
 
107 Förordning (2017:1019) om en europeisk utredningsorder. 
108 Lag (2017:1000) om en europeisk utredningsorder. 
109 Förordning (2017:1019) om en europeisk utredningsorder. 
110 Govt Bill 2016/17:218 Nya regler om bevisinhämtning inom EU SFS: 2017:1000–1021. 
111 Mainly, lagen (2000:562) om internationell rättslig hjälp i brottmål; lagen (2005:500 om erkännande och verkställighet inom Europeiska unionen av frysningsbeslut 
(frysningslagen); and, lagen (2003:1174) om vissa former av internationellt samarbete i brottsutredningar.  
80 | MARCO STEFAN 
 
for actions other than those mentioned in the LIRB Act, and it is the requested state that decides on the 
investigation measure based on its regulatory system. Hence, a Swedish prosecutor can apply for legal 
assistance with a measure that is possible in the other state, even if such a measure is not directly apparent 
from LIRB's provisions or even available under Swedish law. The LIRB Act differs significantly from the 
system provided for in the EIO Act. 
• The decision to issue a cross-border request for access to e-data is taken by the judicial authority that issues 
the request/order, which in Sweden is the prosecutor. This is a general rule, regardless if the request is for 
e-data or other types of evidence. The investigative measures that may be taken are listed in Chapter 1, 
Section 4 of the EIO Act. Paragraph 12 of the section states that other measures that do not involve the use 
of force (tvångsmedel) or other means of coercive measures (tvångsåtgärd) may be taken. 
• The competent court to grant permission is set out in Chapter 19 Code of Judicial Procedure (see its section 
12). 
• A Swedish court has jurisdiction to issue an investigation order for the following measures: Taking of 
evidence at a foreign or Swedish court; Interrogation through audio and video transmission or by audio 
transmission in connection with proceedings; and, transfer of a detained person to or from Sweden in 
connection with proceedings. 
• The Swedish prosecutor's jurisdiction to issue an investigation order is more general (cf. Chapter 2, Section 
1, and Chapter 1, Section 4 of the EIO Act). It covers all measures available during an ongoing preliminary 
investigation if the evidence had been available in Sweden. Exceptions apply to the taking of evidence at a 
foreign court during preliminary investigations and evidence in Sweden according to the Code of Judicial 
Procedure, at the request of the prosecutor. In these cases, the court decides. In addition, if the preliminary 
investigation needs to be resumed during the main proceedings, the prosecutor is responsible for issuing a 
Swedish investigation order. 
• According to Chapter 2, Section 3 of the EIO Act, an investigation order may be issued if the conditions that 
apply to conduct the investigation action during a Swedish investigation or trial in criminal proceedings and 
according to this law are met. A Swedish prosecutor may issue an investigation order for such investigation 
measures that could have been taken in Sweden under equivalent conditions if the evidence had been 
available in Sweden. This means a Swedish prosecutor, for example if he or she wishes to request 
interrogation during the preliminary investigation, must make sure that the conditions set forth in the 
provisions of Chapter 23, Code of Judicial Procedure, and the Preliminary Investigation Proclamation 
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(1947:948) (Förundersökningskungörelsen, FUK) for the measure are met. Sometimes several alternative 
measures are possible. The least intrusive should then be chosen in accordance with the principle of 
proportionality. 
• Chapter 2, Section 4 of the EIO Act states that an investigation order may be issued only if, taking into 
account the detriment for the individual and the time and costs that may be incurred, it appears necessary 
and proportionate to the nature and severity of the crime, and other circumstances. 
• Accordingly, in Chapter 2, Section 3 and 4 of the EIO Act, the conditions for issuing an investigation order 
are stated. However, with regard to the transfer of detainees there is no such investigation measure in 
Swedish law. Chapter 2, Section 12 of the EIO Act therefore states the special conditions for issuing an 
investigation order for this purpose. 
• Under the LIRB Act, Sweden can as a main rule provide assistance even if Sweden does not have an 
agreement on legal assistance in criminal matters with the other state, i.e. no demand for reciprocity 
(mutual assistance) is made. However, a number of countries require an agreement to be able to 
collaborate with Sweden.112 
• Chapter 4 Section 1 of the EIO Act states that there are only a few actions in an investigation order that 
may be appealed. From Article 14 of the EIO Directive follows inter alia that the remedies available under 
national law can be applied to investigative measures specified in the investigation order. The substantive 
reasons for issuing an investigation order may only be considered in proceedings brought in the issuing 
State. The issuing authority and executive authority are obliged to notify each other of the remedies used 
against the issue, recognition or enforcement of an investigation order. The deadlines should be the same 
as in domestic cases and they should be applied so that stakeholders are guaranteed an actual opportunity 
to use remedies available. 
• An investigation measure referred to in a Swedish investigation order may not be appealed otherwise than 
stipulated in the Act (see Chapter 4, Section 1 of the EIO Act).  
• A declaration of enforceability must neither be appealed otherwise than specified in the Act (see Chapter 
4, Section 2 of the Act). A measure in a Swedish declaration of enforceability can only be appealed or tried 
by a court in the following cases: Examination of execution of seizures in accordance with Chapter 3, Section 
32 of the EIO Act; Blocking and access bans, etc. in accordance with Chapter 27, Section 15 Code of Judicial 
 
112 Issues relating to judicial cooperation in criminal matters are also included in some multilateral conventions or bilateral agreements to which Sweden has acceded. 
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Procedure, see Chapter 3, Section 33 of the EIO Act; All cases when investigative action, such as in a Swedish 
preliminary investigation or criminal trial, can only be taken after the court's trial; Interim measures shall 
be notified and tested by the court and may therefore be appealed, cf. Chapter 4, Section 2 of the EIO Act, 
which refers to Chapter 3. Section 9 of the EIO Act, which in turn is supplemented by Chapter 3, Section 10 
of the EIO Act. 
Case law As from the beginning of 2018, there is a new case type for EIOs available. By 7 November 2018, there were in total eight cases 
received by the District Courts so far in 2018, and of those, four had been disposed of.113 
 
 
113 Statistics collected by the Swedish National Courts Administration: Two cases concerning EIO from Gothenburg District Court, one case from Norrtälje District Court, and one 
case from Skarborg District Court, (B 3189-18 presentation of evidence in Court).  
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Annex IV - Methodological note 
The Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) is an independent policy research institute based 
in Brussels. Its mission is to produce sound analytical research leading to constructive solutions 
to challenges facing Europe today.  
The JUD-IT Handbook is based on the research findings generated throughout the JUD-IT 
Project (Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters and Electronic IT Data in the EU: Ensuring 
Efficient Cross-Border Cooperation and Mutual Trust) Project, which received financial support 
from the Justice Programme of the European Union (JUST-AG-2016-01). The information 
included in the Handbook was collected through legal research, primary and secondary data 
collection including semi-structured interviews with national and EU criminal justice policy 
makers, law enforcement officials and judicial practitioners, defence lawyers and civil society 
actors working on issues related to cross-border evidence gathering in criminal matters. 
Expert discussions held during the three meetings of the JUD-IT Task Force also served to foster 
exchange of views and complement the evidence basis used to develop the Handbook. The 
JUD-IT Task Force ran between October 2018 and February 2019. It provided a forum for 
closed-door expert discussions encompassing three separate meetings held at the CEPS 
premises in Brussels. The Task Force made it possible to foster multidisciplinary debate on the 
challenges faced by judicial actors, law enforcement authorities, defence lawyers, and 
providers of internet and telecommunication services dealing with cross-border requests for 
data sought for criminal justice purposes. Civil society actors, legal scholars and experts in 
criminal and data protection law were also actively involved in the Task Force debate. 
The Handbook also incorporates the main outcomes of the JUD-IT Practitioners Workshop 
organised in Brussels in the month of July 2017 by Fair Trials Europe. Results of the comparative 
research performed by the JUD-IT Academic Partners114  in 13 different EU member states115 
has furthermore been leveraged to foster a better understanding of the roles of key 
stakeholders involved in the criminal justice process, and of the challenges they face when 
dealing with cross-border requests for data in the context of criminal proceedings. 
Ngo Chun Luk helped in the development of the Handbook, in particular by designing the 
infographics included in section I. The author would like to thank the rapporteurs and the 
experts and officials who kindly agreed to be interviewed in the context of this research. A 
special mention and acknowledgement should go to the valuable inputs and comments 
provided by the following experts: Fabrizia Bemer, at the Prosecutor’s Office of Court of 
Florence, and Laure Baudrihaye-Gérard, Senior Lawyer at Fair Trials Europe. 
 
114 Aristoteles University of Thessaloniki, Centre for European Policy Studies, Central European University, 
European University Institute, University of Luxembourg, Maastricht University, Uppsala University, Vrije 
Universiteit Brussel. 
115 AT, BE, BU, DE, EI, EL, ES, FR, HU, IT, LU, NL, SW.  
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